

*Prepared for the 26th ECPR Summer School on Political Parties. The University of Nottingham (UK), School of Politics and International Relations, 12 September - 23 September, 2016. This is a preliminary draft that will be revised. Comments welcome.*

# **A Springboard to the Domestic Arena? Second-Order Success, First-Order Gains and the European Electoral Cycle**

Julia Schulte-Cloos

21 August 2016

[Word Count: 9250]

## **Abstract**

European Parliament (EP) elections offer a distinct incentive structure to voters as there is no government formation at stake. Triggering protest and non-strategical votes, small and radical parties enjoy structural advantages in the supranational contest. While these patterns are well established in the literature, it remains puzzling how success in the second-order arena impinges on the parties' first-order trajectories. We lack a systematic understanding of the implications that the secondary elections themselves have on party competition within the domestic arena. This paper posits that EP elections serve as a springboard for success in the national arena. The institution of the EP elections along with the different voting calculi therein has unanticipated consequences for domestic party competition. Drawing on a novel database encompassing the electoral results of all EU member states in national and EP elections since 1979, the temporal distance between these elections, and their position within the respective electoral cycles, I show that particularly populist radical right parties benefit from a spillover of European success to the national arena. This effect is especially pronounced if the temporal distance between the national and the European election is close. The results suggest that the institution of EP elections not only provides these parties with a permeable forum for politicising Europe and their antagonism towards further integration, but that the European campaign also bestows salience upon their nationalistic policy demands.

# 1. Introduction

In contrast to many other European countries, Germany had long been lacking an established populist radical right party in its party system (Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen 2011).<sup>1</sup> Yet, in the Federal Election 2013, the ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD) just missed the entry into the parliament by 0.3 percent, narrowly failing the 5 percent threshold. Only eight months later, the Eurosceptic right-wing party managed to secure 7.1 percent of the German votes in the European Parliament (EP) – without even spelling out the word ‘Europe’ on a single poster during the campaign (Struller 2014). Immediately after this success, nation-wide opinion polls reported an increase in public support to 8 percentage points, while over the course of the following year constantly indicating that the party would pass the national threshold. Would the German AfD have entered the ‘Bundestag’ if the Federal Election had taken place after its breakthrough in the European elections? In other European countries the populist radical right has already fruitfully built on supranational success: only four months after performing unexpectedly successful in the 2014 EP elections, the ‘Sverigedemokraterna’ (SD) managed to double their result in the Swedish ‘Riksdag’ election compared to their previous national result. Anticipating the domestic significance of a success in the EP elections 2009, the Dutch ‘Partij Voor de Vrijheid’ (PVV) deliberately chose to concentrate all their efforts on the supranational election in view of the upcoming national elections one year later (De Lange and Art 2011). After becoming the second-largest party in the EP elections, the party around its populist leader Geert Wilders had no difficulties to come in third in the domestic league.

According to the second-order elections theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980), small and opposition parties are likely to be successful in European elections. The fact that there is no government formation at stake has important consequences for the voting calculus: it gives not only rise to protest votes for radical parties, but also to sincere expressions of policy preferences for domestically less viable parties. By offering this different incentive structure to voters, second-order elections facilitate the success of small and radical parties (Hix and Marsh 2007).

While these patterns are well established in the literature, it remains puzzling how this success in the second-order arena relates to the parties’ first-order trajectories. Although scholars have extensively researched whether, in which contexts, and to what extent European elections are still ‘second-order’ national contests, the literature on EP elections has been surprisingly silent about the first-order consequences of these elections.

Notwithstanding that the EP is a supranational election, the related campaigns still take place on the national level and national parties run for office in the European contests (Bol et al. 2016; Katz 1999, p. 22). This renders the countries’ party system, media, and electorate congruent in the domestic and European arena (van der Brug et al. 2007). Consequently, the institution of the EP elections and the structural advantages that small and radical parties

---

<sup>1</sup>This paper follows the work of Cas Mudde in defining the populist radical right as sharing a combination of three core ideological features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde 2007, pp. 23-31).

enjoy therein may have ‘unanticipated consequences’ for national party competition (Franklin et al. 1996a, p. 384). Despite low levels of voter turnout, the very existence of the EP elections itself may restructure domestic party competition. Thus far, we lack a systematic understanding of the implications of these secondary elections that are ‘not performing as elections are supposed to perform’ (van der Brug and de Vreese 2016).

This paper posits that EP elections serve as a springboard for success in the national arena for small and radical parties and presents the first encompassing empirical analysis of such possible supranational spillover effects. The main contribution of the study is twofold: By changing the focus from the European to the *national* arena, the paper firstly shows that EP elections have important and unanticipated ‘first-order effects’ for domestic party competition within member states. These momentum effects are particularly pronounced whenever the two type of elections are held temporally proximate to each other and they most strongly contribute to the electoral fortunes of populist radical right actors. Second, the study delves into the underlying mechanisms and disentangles the spillover effect from both organisational or cartel arguments as well as from explanations assuming a mere congruence of voters’ preferences across governance levels. Depending on the temporal proximity to the subsequent national election, a strong EP electoral result can reduce information uncertainty about small and radical parties, signal viability, and contribute to a greater legitimacy of radical parties – thereby engendering unintended ‘first-order effects’ of these second-order elections.

## **2. Literature Review and Theory**

### **2.1. Electoral Success for Small and Radical Parties in EP Elections**

Existing research shows that small and radical parties have a higher chance for electoral success in EP elections than in national elections because of 1) the secondary character of the EP elections, 2) the salience of Europe in their policy proposals and their stances on European issues, and 3) the permissiveness of the electoral system in the European arena.

Firstly, according to the second-order elections theory, small and radical parties have better prospects to electorally succeed in EP elections as opposed to national elections since the elected representatives in the European arena do not decide about government formation. The lack of such parliamentary power along with only gradually expanding legislative competences renders the EP elections secondary to the national election (Franklin and Hobolt 2011; Reif 1984; Reif and Schmitt 1980; Schmitt and Toygür 2016; van der Eijk et al. 1996). This subordinated character of the EP contest has important implications for the voting calculus therein: many voters use the supranational elections instrumentally to punish their national governments (Hix and Marsh 2007; Hong 2015; Marsh 1998; Marsh and Franklin 2007; Reif and Schmitt 1980).

Secondly, voters are inclined to support a small or radical party in the EP elections since

mainstream parties are commonly more pro-European than their average supporters (Hobolt et al. 2009; Irwin 1995; Reif and Schmitt 1997). This argument gains particular relevance with regards to the strong anti-European position of many radical parties (de Vries and Edwards 2009; Hooghe et al. 2002). Populist radical right and populist radical left parties contribute to politicising Europe on the cultural or the economic dimension of political conflict, respectively (Grande and Hutter 2016; Kriesi et al. 2006). Following a Downsian logic of spatial voting (Downs 1957) and assuming that voters are less strongly in support of European integration than mainstream political elites (Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Hobolt and Wittrock 2011), radical parties opposing EU integration enjoy a systematic advantage over their mainstream competitors and most green party competitors (de Vries and Edwards 2009; Kriesi et al. 2006; Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). Thus, if voters derive their choice from a European agenda (Clark and Rohrschneider 2009; de Vries et al. 2011; Ferrara 2004; Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Hobolt and Wittrock 2011; Hobolt et al. 2013; Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Trechsel et al. 2015; Weber 2009), those parties who represent anti-European attitudes of voters and make this issue salient gain advantages over those parties who do not take a strong stance on the anti-EU dimension (van Egmond 2007).

Thirdly, there is a mechanic component of the EP electoral system that eases success of radical and small parties in these contests compared to domestic ones (Oppenhuis et al. 1996). Including the EP election of 1999, all member states apply a proportional representation (PR) formula to elect the supranational representatives. Furthermore, most member states (23 out of 28) use a single nation-wide electoral district for the EP elections, rendering the electoral system more permissive for small parties and non-established party actors (Cox 1997; Dimitras 1996; Gschwend 2009; Leys 1959; Sartori 1968).

In sum, the distinct subordinated character and the salience of European policies seemingly induce a different voting rationale amongst voters who turn out in the European election.<sup>2</sup> Whether these voters express their dissatisfaction with their national governments or align their vote closely with their policy preference (being European, domestic or Eurosceptic in nature), small and radical party actors enjoy advantages in the EP elections. Importantly, these advantages are further amplified by the permissive electoral formulas applied in EP elections.

In the following, I contend that the benefits for small and radical parties in the European arena do also impinge on their domestic trajectories. European electoral successes may signal viability and credibility of a party, and may augment its visibility in the domestic arena – in particular, if a short distance between the European and the national election increases the salience of European issues.

---

<sup>2</sup>The different turnout levels in European and national elections, however, seem to relate mostly to the timing of the EP elections on the structural level and to patterns of habitual voting on the individual level (Franklin et al. 1996b; Schmitt and Mannheimer 1991). Thus, the disparity of electoral participation in the EP and the national contest in itself does not evoke systematic benefits for small or radical party actors in EP elections (Schmitt and van der Eijk 2007).

## 2.2. Domestic Momentum and Bandwagon Effects

I argue that small and radical parties gain momentum (Mutz 1997; Holbrook 1996, p. 130) when performing successfully in EP elections as strong EP results create bandwagon effects in the domestic arena.

Since virtually the same *national* parties and major *national* actors contest both the EP elections and the following first-order elections (van der Eijk and van der Brug 2007, p. 7; Bardi et al. 2010) – only with a different voting calculus prevailing in the respective election, success of a radical or small party in the second-order arena will lead to increased media attention, a heightened domestic visibility of the party, and greater attention levels by national party elites (Oppenhuis et al. 1996, p. 302). Not only does this increased domestic visibility reduce the information uncertainty about small and radical parties that voters face when casting a ballot (Schmitt-Beck 1996, p. 268), the parties also gain political viability and credibility when gaining parliamentary representation (Curtice 2014; Spoon 2011, p. 117). Thus, a strong EP electoral result can become a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ in the domestic arena (Farrer 2015), leave a ‘permanent mark on national and party politics’ (Curtice 1989, p. 217), and trigger spillover effects to the first-order arena.

Research on bandwagon effects in the context of US primary elections (e.g. Bartels 1988) shows that information on mass support for a certain candidate does not only impact strategic vote considerations (Zech 1975), but also evokes attitudinal change among voters (Mutz 1997). Confronted with information on high support levels for a certain candidate – so-called ‘consensus clues’ – individuals re-evaluate the candidate based on this information. They rehearse their political views in light of the arguments that they deem explanatory for the high mass support levels. Importantly, this process involves priming of the perceived others’ political views and cognitive engagement with arguments that ‘would not otherwise have come to mind’ (Mutz 1997, p. 105). Consequently, a strong EP performance of a small or radical actor triggers priming of the successful party and its policy positions in the minds of voters.

This cognitive response towards consensus-clues taken from European success may, however, not spark the same domestic (electoral) reactions to any small or radical party’s performance. In fact, an extreme position of the party (on the left-right dimension) further boosts the national ‘newsworthiness’ (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Bale 2012) of its second-order success, contributing to stronger priming effects on behalf of the voters. Similarly, also domestic party competitors’ reaction to a radical challenger might be more pronounced if the party elites believe that this supranational performance is also of domestic importance in potentially restructuring or polarising domestic party competition. Since green party actors tend to be more central on a left-right dimension than populist radical right or populist radical left actors, I expect that their prospects for an electoral spillover from the European to the national arena are worse.

*Hypothesis 1:* The higher the vote share of a small or radical party in the European Par-

liament elections, the greater the increase in subsequent national electoral gains.

*Hypothesis 2:* The effect in *H1* will be more pronounced for radical party actors.

### 2.3. The Effect of Electoral Timing

The priming effects proposed in hypotheses H1 and H2 are conditional on the EP election – and the results therein – being cognitively available to voters and national party actors. A close temporal distance between the two elections makes the related second-order voting calculus and the actual information on electoral success in the EP arena relevant for both the electorate and party elites. Hence, EP elections held closely before a national contest serve as a ‘marker-set’ for the domestic arena, attracting greater attention to the contest and its results on the political demand- and supply side (Oppenhuis et al. 1996; van der Eijk et al. 1996, p. 301).

For the voters, it is easier to retrieve the information on the EP electoral success from memory and, hence, encourages evaluations and political judgements based on this information. Not only is uncertainty about the party’s ideological profile lowest whenever second- and first-order election campaigns coincide, it should also be more likely that individuals will base their vote decision on the ‘consensus cues’ (Mutz 1997) taken from the European campaign. Importantly, voters gain these cues and might accordingly rehearse their domestic vote choice irrespective of whether they participate in the EP elections. Among those voters, who cast their ballots in the supranational contest, however, the electoral choice for a small and radical party in the EP elections is also more likely to be ‘sticky’ during the period around EP elections. As European politics and the EU agenda mostly take place in the shadow of national politics (Beaudonnet and Franklin 2016), habitual voting (Bhatti et al. 2016; Bølstad et al. 2013; Converse 1969; Dinas 2014; Roßteutscher et al. 2014) should become more likely whenever the supranational contest and the respective voting decision are primed (Iyengar et al. 1984) in the mind of voters. Consequently, I posit that the momentum effects of success in the EP arena should be most pronounced when the temporal distance to the national election is very short, i.e. when voters are more strongly primed by the EP election.<sup>3</sup>

Similarly, on the political supply-side, elites’ attention to a small or radical challenger party is highest just after an advantageous EP result, engendering a greater publicity of the party on the macro-level (Franklin et al. 1996a, p. 92; Mudde 2007, p. 254). According to the news value theory (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Bale 2012), the more distant the previous EP is

---

<sup>3</sup>In line with the idea that temporal proximity is crucial for any effects of the EP elections to materialise, recent research also indicates priming effects of EP elections on attitudes towards EU integration. Beaudonnet and Franklin (2016) show that diffuse public support for the EU is generally on decline – yet, on top of this negative time trend any EP election itself also induces a shock to this gradually decreasing support, dampening the support for the EU in particular in the year of an EP election.

apart from the national election, the less ‘newsworthy’, important and *nationally* relevant EP success should be, contributing to a gradually fading media coverage and public visibility of the party’s performance. Yet, prior to an upcoming EP election, news coverage on European issues and relevant party actors is equally invigorated (Schulze 2016). Thus, when a national election promptly follows a European second-order contest, or when the next European election is already in sight, the domestic elections and their respective campaigns should be more permissive to non-exclusively domestic issues and to non-exclusively first-order voting calculi.

Consequently, I posit that the momentum effects of success in the EP arena should be most pronounced when the two elections are held temporally proximate to each other, i.e. when both voters and party elites are more strongly primed by the event of the supranational contest along with its distinct subordinated character, the second-order related voting calculi, and the respective electoral results. Accordingly, I argue:

*Hypothesis 3:* The effect in *H1* should be more pronounced the shorter the temporal distance between an EP election and a national election.

## 2.4. The Distinctiveness of European Second-Order Elections

EP elections are evidently not the only ‘secondary’ elections held in European member states. Many of the European countries hold subnational elections which share some key features of the second-order framework with EP elections (Dinkel 1977). While information uncertainty about parties decreases also during other ‘second-order’ contests like regional elections (presuming they are covered by national media (Bechtel 2012)), there is one decisive difference between the two kinds of second-order elections. This difference is the very premise of the second-order elections theory: in EP elections there is no government formation at stake.

Crucially there is, however, government formation at stake in regional or state-level elections. Moreover, when analysing spillover effects from the European level to the national level, we are able to 1) hold the party system constant (Bardi et al. 2010; Katz 1999). This is rarely true for federally or decentrally organised countries where exclusively regional parties may compete only in subnational elections (Deschouwer 2006). It holds 2) also the eligible electorate constant, which is *per definitionem* not the case in regional elections (Schakel 2013). Importantly, the institution of regional elections is also 3) less endogenous to demand- and supply-side driven party system change. Not all 28 European countries hold regional elections, and among those who do so, some have only recently introduced these elections *in response* to greater demands for regional authority within their countries (Masseti and Toubeau 2013; Toubeau and Wagner 2015). Conversely, all European member states have participated in the EP elections since the introduction of these direct elections in 1979. The institution of the direct EP elections can equally not be considered exogenous to political elites’ preferences. Yet, the fact that any given

member state has consistently participated in these elections renders this political institution at least less endogenous to supply-side driven change than the institution of regional elections.

### 3. Data and Research Design

If EP elections shape the trajectories of small and radical national parties, a high EP electoral result should be associated with an increase in the national result compared to the previous national performance, in particular if the temporal distance between both elections is short. To analyse such possible electoral ‘first-order effects’, I create a dataset encompassing aggregate electoral data of national results of European member states<sup>4</sup> following a European election, the respective election dates, and the temporal distance between both elections.

The electoral data ranges from the first EP election held on 10 June 1979 up until the most recent national election held at the time of writing the paper (the Spanish general election on 22 June 2016). The election dates and respective vote shares between 1979 and 2016 are taken from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2016) and the European Election Database (European Election Database 2016). It includes all parties gaining at least one percent of the votes, or at least a single seat.<sup>5</sup> I first describe the operationalisation of the dependent variable and the central independent variables. Subsequently, I discuss the time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis accounting for the time dynamic nature of the data, while including country fixed effects and time-variant control variables.

#### 3.1. Operationalisation

The analysis considers green, populist radical left and populist radical right party actors. The classification follows expert surveys (Bakker et al. 2015; Benoit and Laver 2006; Castles and Mair 1984; Huber and Inglehart 1995) and is reported in table 3 of the appendix. Given the different degrees of party institutionalisation and the different lengths of party survival, the main analysis considers the respective party family within each national election of a country as the unit of observation (see for a similar approach Oppenhuis et al. 1996, p. 291). The appendix provides the respective results using the individual parties within each election as observational unit. The former design is preferred over the latter as individual parties with a history of being successful (both in the European and national space) are not overrepresented in the respective resulting sample. Thus, parties that cannot flourish in one or both arenas do not remain neglected in the sample. Moreover, especially Eastern European party systems have been characterised more volatile than their Western counterparts (Kitschelt 1992), both

---

<sup>4</sup>Though the EU, as of July 2016, has 28 member states, the sample includes only 27 country-clusters since Croatia does not have sufficient observations to perform the within-estimation, i.e. two national elections each following an EP election, see the discussion on the fixed-effects estimation below.

<sup>5</sup>Note, however, that the ParlGov database also includes the largest electoral ‘loser’ failing to gain representation. As part of electoral alliances, parties might also individually gain less than one percentage of the vote, see discussion below.

because of a lower degree of institutionalisation and because of the common re-affiliation patterns of individual politicians (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003; Laver and Benoit 2003; Tavits 2008). Finally, following the theoretical arguments presented above, party families are also conceptually speaking a more interesting unit of observation than individual parties: a greater social legitimacy and visibility of radical parties within the domestic discourse is not limited to the respective individual party but – to the extent that a European success is perceived to possibly restructure domestic party competition, may expand to other respective radical parties. Importantly, however, there are only a few elections in which several successful parties within one party family contested an election – e.g. the two Latvian radical right populist parties ‘All for Latvia’ and ‘For Fatherland and Freedom’ in the Latvian general election 2006; in these cases the total vote share of the party family is considered.

Turning to the central independent variables, the temporal distance is conceptualised relative to the full European electoral cycle. Hence, the position of a national election within a European electoral cycle can be understood as the difference in days between the national and the European election divided by the overall length of the European legislation period:

$$Cycle = \frac{NE_t - EP_{t-1}}{EP_{t+1} - EP_{t-1}} \quad (1)$$

where  $NE_t$  is the national election date,  $EP_{t-1}$  the date of the previous EP election, and  $EP_{t+1}$  the date of the next EP election.

EP elections are held every five years, rendering the denominator to be approximately 1825 days. Following the arguments about a heightened momentum effect in case of temporal proximity of national and EP elections, I also include a quadratic specification of the cycle variable.

There are a number of (mostly unobservable) country-specific factors that facilitate small and radical parties’ success like the institutionalisation of a country’s party system or the ‘fascist legacy’ (Decker and Miliopoulos 2009). In light of this time-invariant heterogeneity between the 27 European member states in the analysis, a between-country estimator is likely to render biased estimates due to unobserved heterogeneity. Consequently, a within estimator on the country-level is preferred to control for the country-specific between-variation. Hence, all time-invariant covariates that might both influence the vote share of a small and radical party in the national and in the European context are simply controlled for by cluster ‘demeaning’ the data. Hence, even in the presence of such omitted constant variables, which may be arbitrarily related to the observables  $x_{it}$ , the partial effect of the variables of interest can still be estimated consistently (Wooldridge 2010, p. 266).

To account for the dynamic nature of electoral results, the model estimates the *difference* in national vote shares as a function of the interaction between the EP electoral result and the cycle variable (and the respective constitutive terms) while controlling for the lagged vote

share of the previous national election (at time  $t - 1$ ).<sup>6</sup> The country-fixed effects equation can be described as follows:

$$\Delta\dot{y}_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\dot{y}_{it-1} + \beta_2\ddot{x}_{is} + \beta_3\ddot{c}_{it} + \beta_4(\ddot{x}_{is} * \ddot{c}_{it}) + \beta_k\ddot{z}_{it} + \ddot{u}_{it} \quad (2)$$

for  $i = 1 \dots 27$  EU member states;  $t = 1 \dots n$  national elections in EU member state  $i$ , and  $s = 1 \dots 8$  EP elections preceding the national elections;

where  $\dot{y} = y_{it} - \bar{y}_i$  (correspondingly for  $x, c, z, u$ );  $y$  = vote share of respective party in national election,  $x$  = vote share in EP election,  $c$  = position of the national election within a European electoral cycle (see equation 1),  $\mathbf{z}$  = vector of control variables. Unit of analysis is the country-election level, regression estimation per small and radical party family (variance of the residuals varies across party families).

Though most of the electoral systems of European member states are also time-invariant during the observation period, there have been some electoral changes (e.g. in Italy), which requires to control for the permissiveness of the electoral system in a country. Consequently, I include the logarithm of the average district magnitude in each country's national elections (Johnson and Wallack 2010).<sup>7</sup> Similarly, the logarithm of the average district magnitude in the EP elections is introduced as a covariate.<sup>8</sup> The national electoral thresholds have been constant within EU member states,<sup>9</sup> rendering this possible confounder time-invariant. Yet, in some member states there have been changes to the thresholds in place for the EP elections. Hitherto, the model takes respect to the country-specific EP electoral threshold.

Furthermore, the character of the respective preceding EP election itself might be conditional on variables that the literature has identified to increase the extent of 'second-orderness' of a European election. Thus, the model takes into account whether or not the EP election was a 'midterm' election (Weber 2011) as well as the number of EP elections, in which a country has participated. The latter is included as it may determine the level of experience citizens have with second-order contests and the likelihood that they base their vote on second-order

<sup>6</sup>This specification corresponds to a partial adjustment model (see de Boef and Keele 2008, p. 190). Apart from the theoretical reasons to estimate the differences in change, the model is also empirically justified. To test this, I follow the suggested procedure of de Boef and Keele (2008) and first estimate a general error correction model. Subsequently, the difference between the coefficient of the lagged EP vote share in the most general model and the first differenced EP vote share is assessed for its significance. Since this difference is not significantly different from zero, the partial adjustment model is also empirically supported (see de Boef and Keele 2008, p. 190). Moreover, the model including the lagged dependent variable is superior over the general model in terms of its BIC.

<sup>7</sup>The logarithmic transformation accounts for the fact that increases in the district magnitude might have a larger effect for low values of the variable as opposed to their effect for large values.

<sup>8</sup>The average district magnitude at the EP level is calculated using official national statistical sources. 23 of the 28 European member states function as a single constituency (European Parliament. Directorate General for Research 2014).

<sup>9</sup>See e.g. Carey and Hix (2011). The only exception is a single election in France (1986) that used a five percent threshold. The results are, however, not sensitive to the inclusion of the national electoral threshold as a covariate.

calculations (Marsh 1998, p. 597; Hix and Marsh 2011, p. 6).

The character of the EP elections and the legislative power of the EP itself has changed since the introduction of the EP elections in 1979. To account for these changes and for possible other time-specific unobserved heterogeneity within the observation period, I introduce four decade dummy variables. The model controls for the state of the economy of a country that might contribute to a high number of protest or anti-government votes by including the unemployment rate (International Monetary Fund 2016). To account for the fact that some of the small party actors might themselves get punished in the EP elections if they were in government before, an indicator variable measures whether the parties were part of the national executive at the time of the respective EP election.<sup>10</sup>

### 3.2. Descriptive Data Analysis

Table 4 summarises key descriptive statistics of the data and the control variables used in the model. The analysis consists of 174 national elections of EU member states.

EP elections take place every five years, while most European member states hold elections every four years. Thus, within some EP election cycles, countries hold more than one national election, meaning that these 174 national elections are related to only 131 EP elections. Every fourth observation in the data (24.71%) refers to the same EP election result as the previous country-specific observation.

Figure 1: Number of national elections following the a EP election within the same European cycle





Figure 2: Distribution of Cycle Variable



Yet, while the EP vote share is equivalent for these cases, the cycle values are necessarily different from each other, introducing greater within-variation among these observations and rendering the central interaction term of interest to be largely independent from the previous observations. Figure 1 shows the number of national elections following a EP election within

<sup>10</sup>While the results are robust to including the respective electoral turnout rates, the main model does not account for this variable as there are no prior theoretical reasons to assume a systematic impact of the different turnout levels on the electoral prospects of small or radical party actors, see section 2.1.

the same European electoral cycle. Figure 2 shows the variation of the position of national elections within the European electoral cycle. The data is very equally distributed, facilitating the interpretation of the interaction term in the analysis (Brambor et al. 2006).

## 4. Results

Table 1 shows the results of the TSCS country-fixed effects regression. Following the theoretical arguments about a close temporal distance between a European and national election, all models present a linear and a quadratic specification of the cycle variable (see figures 3, 4, 5).

Table 1: Fixed-Effects Regression Results on  $\Delta$  National Vote Share by Party Families

	Populist Radical Left		Green Parties		Populist Radical Right	
	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic
EP Vote	0.532*** (0.088)	0.558*** (0.109)	0.281*** (0.080)	0.373*** (0.095)	0.604*** (0.108)	0.915*** (0.149)
Cycle	1.859 (1.150)	2.256 (4.926)	1.662** (0.769)	6.217** (2.899)	3.171** (1.331)	0.910 (4.902)
Cycle <sup>2</sup>		-0.408 (5.188)		-5.119 (3.095)		1.941 (5.198)
EP Vote * Cycle	-0.367*** (0.130)	-0.564 (0.481)	-0.183* (0.095)	-0.808** (0.375)	-0.342** (0.172)	-2.325*** (0.677)
EP Vote * Cycle <sup>2</sup>		0.213 (0.501)		0.705* (0.413)		2.320*** (0.758)
Orthogonal Polynom (p-value)		p>0.10		p>0.10		p<0.05
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Decade Fixed-Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Robustness of (Non-) Significance of Interaction Term</b>						
Cluster Robust SE	✓	✓	x	✓	x	✓
Pairs Cluster Bootstrapped SE	✓	✓	x	x	x	✓
Jackknife Parties	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party Fixed-Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
BIC	879.301	889.278	709.926	715.743	948.747	941.266
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.578	0.579	0.451	0.465	0.446	0.500
N	174	174	174	174	174	174


\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. Standard Errors in parentheses. Robustness of interaction effect: pairs cluster bootstrapped SE to account for small cluster size. Jackknife reruns analysis while omitting one party each regression. Party-fixed effects uses party-specific dummies instead of country dummies.

The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) gives some first clues on which specification fits the model better.<sup>11</sup> While for the Greens and the populist radical left, the linear model has

<sup>11</sup>The BIC weights the explanatory benefit of additional covariates against the costs of added model complexity, hence, it can serve as a useful indicator for the model fit. Note, however, that in contrast to the R<sup>2</sup> values, lower values denote a better fit and that the BIC is not comparable across different models for party families.

a superior fit, for the populist radical right the quadratic cycle specification seems to fit the model better. When specifying the cycle variable as an orthogonal polynomial function,<sup>12</sup> the significance level of the interaction terms further corroborates the respective linear or curvilinear relationships. Analysing the p-values of the interaction term between the EP vote share and these second-order orthogonal polynomials of the cycle variable, that are not affected by multicollinearity to the linear specification thereof, the data only supports the populist radical right competitors’ curvilinear pattern.

Figure 3: Marginal effect of Green vote share in EP election on subsequent national election conditional on position of the national election within the European cycle




Turning to the substantive interpretation of the results, it is firstly worth to note that populist radical left and populist radical right party actors enjoy greater marginal national gains than their green counterparts when increasing their vote share in the EP elections (see figure 3 and column 3 and 4 in table 1). No matter how closely the two elections follow upon each other, an increase in their European result does not prompt a considerable superior domestic performance of Green parties. The marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in the European arena on a Green party’s performance compared to its last national result is close to zero, indicating that the European result does not serve as a domestic ‘marker’ for these party actors. In light of the existing literature arguing that voters are more likely to defect from their national vote in the supranational elections (switching to Green parties) if they prefer the environmental issue to be instituted at the EP level (Carrubba and Timpone 2005, p. 273; Gabel 2000), this result suggests that the (transnational) policy agenda of Green

<sup>12</sup>In an orthogonal polynomial function, the model matrix is first internally set up and then re-scaled in a way that each column of the quadratic cycle variable is orthogonal to the previous ones. This procedure does not change the coefficients but has the advantage that a (non-)significant polynomial is not mistakenly interpreted as such because of multicollinearity. A low orthogonal p-value therefore denotes a certain order term’s model improvement over the lower orders, i.e. it indicates that the quadratic specification adds explanatory power on its own.

party actors mitigates a first-order spillover. In line with hypothesis H2, Green parties' success in the European arena does seemingly not heighten their national visibility strongly enough, thereby discouraging bandwagon effects in the next domestic electoral contest. Not only might this be due to their environmental or perceived 'supranational' policy agenda, but also due to lower domestic demand- and supply-side attention levels towards their European success stemming from the non-extremity of these party actors.

Figure 4: Marginal effect of Populist Radical Right vote share in EP election on subsequent national election conditional on position of the national election within the European cycle




For radical right party actors, in contrast, we observe a considerable electoral spillover. All other things being equal, the effect of an increase of one percentage point in the European electoral arena assists these parties to push forward their electoral fortune in the subsequent national contest by more than 0.7 percentage points compared to their previous domestic result – provided this election takes place within one year after the EP election (position of the national election within the European electoral cycle below 0.2, see table 5). The longer the EP election dates back, however, the smaller the marginal gains that a populist radical right party retrieves out of its European success. Is the national election held in the very middle of the European electoral cycle, an increase in the European vote share by one percentage point only permits radical right actors to surpass their previous national result by 0.3. This feeble improvement differs statistically significantly (on the 95% level) from an electoral spillover in a national election being held up until half a year after a European election. Notably, if the next EP election is already in sight, the populist radical right can re-build on its European fortune. With the national election taking place a year prior to the next EP election (cycle variable roughly 0.8) – i.e. at a time where the immediate ‘marker’ of European success has long lost its validity, a previously strong second-order result re-provides populist right-wing actors with domestic advantages. They are able to improve upon their previous domestic result by more

than half a percentage point. The salience of European issues and the EP elections itself seemingly serves to these party actors as a ‘highly symbolic issue that fits their traditionalist-communitarian ideology’ (Bornschieer 2010, p. 63). Roughly two months ahead of the next EP election, their marginal national gains are also statistically significantly different (yet, only on the 90% level) from the insubstantial gains in the middle of a European electoral cycle. The results suggest that the absence of meaningful elections for a strong European Parliament and the salience of a ‘deliberately sedated’ giant (Mair 2007) coupled with structural advantages that populist radical right parties enjoy in the supranational arena ‘feed[s] into national politics’ (Mair 2007, p. 13).

Hence, for the populist radical right, the empirical results give strong support to hypothesis H1 and H3 – the closer the temporal distance between a first-order and a second-order election, the higher the chances that a strong EP result of these party competitors leaves an imprint on their national fortunes.

Figure 5: Marginal effect of Populist Radical Left vote share in EP election on subsequent national election conditional on position of the national election within the European cycle



For the radical left, these hypotheses are, in contrast, only partially corroborated by the analysis: while the average marginal effect is positive over most of the entire cycle, suggesting that a great EP electoral result is indeed associated with national gains, this effect is not significant once the national election is held towards the end of the European electoral cycle. In the quadratic cycle specification, there is also no evidence that an upcoming EP election re-boosts their prospects for electoral success. The linearly decreasing marginal effect of these party actors suggests that a strong EP result only provides them with a one-shot, quickly evaporating increase in national visibility rather than with a heightened salience of their policy issues even ahead of the next second-order election. For the radical left, the EP elections in itself does not seem to prime voters in a way that would benefit them in the national arena.

The latter finding is only valid for populist radical right party actors and is robust towards 1) the exclusion of single parties from the analysis (jackknife procedure, see figure 8a) and 2) to the estimation of party-fixed effects instead of country-fixed effects to account for unobserved organisational differences between parties that might determine both their EP electoral success and subsequent national success (see figure 9).<sup>13</sup> The results are also not sensitive to 3) the bootstrapping of standard errors to confront a possible overconfidence due to the small cluster size within the sample.<sup>14</sup>

#### 4.1. Congruence of Voters' Policy Preferences?

Despite the strong robustness of the results, the regression only establishes an association between an increase in the EP electoral result of radical right parties and resulting gains in the domestic arena. Importantly, however, it does not allow to assess whether the findings are driven by a high congruence of voters' policy preferences across the first- and second-order arena and similar popularity levels of parties in temporally proximate elections. To the extent that election results measure voter preferences and a party's current popularity, the closer to (or further apart from) each other two elections are held, the greater (lower) the association between the results to be expected. Disregarding the voluminous empirical evidence from the second-order literature<sup>15</sup> and instead assuming that voters' preferences are congruent across the national and supranational governance levels, the cyclical spillover effect could merely stem from similar popularity levels of radical right parties. Their association should be higher the closer the election day of a European and a domestic contest.

If this was the case, however, we should find precisely the same cyclical pattern when predicting the success of radical right parties in the *European* election (dependent variable) conditional on the interaction between temporal distance to the last *national* election and the respective electoral result. Provided populist radical parties can capitalise on gains in the national arena in a similar cyclical way when competing in the European arena soon after, we need to raise doubts about a 'causal' impact or spillover effect from the European achievements to the national arena. Thus, figure 6 shows a *vice versa* placebo-test, plotting the marginal effect of an increase in the national result on the subsequent increase in the supranational arena, while simultaneously including the previous control variables. While the effect of national gains on European performance is positive over the entire national electoral cycle, there is no evidence for a similar cyclical spillover pattern. The linear interaction term is insignificant (p-value=0.32) and suggests a reasonably stable marginal effect over the full domestic legislation


---

<sup>13</sup>Note, however, that in the party-fixed effects analysis, the substantively small marginal effect of a one percentage increase in the EP result turns also statistically insignificant for temporally distant EP and national elections, see figure 9 in the appendix.

<sup>14</sup>These standard errors are pairs cluster bootstrapped, see the appendix, Esarey and Menger (2016) and King and Roberts (2014) for a detailed discussion.

<sup>15</sup>The empirical differences in parties' results at concurrent national and European election, however, also support the idea that different voting calculi apply to both kind of elections.

Figure 6: Placebo test. Marginal effect of Populist Radical Right vote share in national election on subsequent EP election conditional on position of the European election within the national cycle



period – irrespective of the timing of the EP election. The quadratic cycle specification gives, in contrast, some support to the notion of the seminal second-order literature. The inverted u-curve of the marginal effect in the next European contest indicates that EP elections in the middle of a national electoral cycle augment the prospects for European success (though the interaction term is non-significant,  $p\text{-value}=0.21$ ).

Supposing that the spillover from the second-order arena to the domestic competition levels is only driven by a high congruence of voters’ preferences across governance levels, we should, however find the same decreasing strength of association between the national and the European election the further the two elections or ‘accurate measures’ of preferences are apart from each other. Yet, the proposed placebo-test shows a very different pattern. This provides evidence for the idea that the institution of the EP elections and the salience of European integration in itself fosters the electoral spillover of populist radical right success rather than a mere high correlation between voters’ policy preferences spanning the different governance levels.

#### 4.2. Momentum Effects or Organisational Empowerment?

Not only does the signal of European success empower populist radical right actors with a greater salience of their policy issues, an increased visibility, or legitimacy in the domestic arena, the second-order gains also entitle them to amplified organisational benefits. A prominent strand in the literature on Western European party systems (the so-called ‘cartel thesis’) argues that access to state resources and subsidies is crucial in shaping parties’ electoral fortunes and trajectories by providing parliamentary insiders with the necessary material means to sustain and enlarge their electoral prospects (Bolleyer 2009; Dinas et al. 2015; Katz and Mair 1995,

2009). Thus, it might merely be these financial advantages that account for the spillover of second-order success to the national arena more than a momentum effect stemming from European success. There is large variation in the regulations on the provision of state subsidies, indirect public funding and media access within the European member states (van Biezen and Rashkova 2014) and the exact level of financial provisions hinges not only on the representation in the EP. While these complex regulations make a precise measurement of the extent of such an organisational effect difficult, they all share one feature in common: the subsidies are tied to the actual electoral result of the parties (Katz and Mair 1995, p. 15). The better the electoral performance of a party in the EP elections, the larger also the provisions that this party actor receives in response to it.

Consequently, a conservative test to assess whether the institution of the EP election in itself prompts the salience of populist radical right parties' issues and fosters their visibility in the national arena (in addition to benefits from a potential greater organisational capacity), is given by reassessing the impact of the EP election *irrespectively* of a party's actual electoral performance therein. Yet, when re-estimating the model without taking the actual vote share of the party actors into account nor including any other party-specific characteristics (the party's prior national government participation), the quadratic cycle variable maintains its statistical significance (see table 2).<sup>16</sup> The coefficient indicates the same u-curved relationship between temporal proximity of national and European elections and marginal gains in the national vote shares of populist radical right parties.

Table 2: Fixed-Effects Regression Results on  $\Delta$  National Vote Share by Party Families

	Populist Radical Left	Green Parties	Populist Radical Right
	Linear	Linear	Quadratic
Cycle	0.304 (1.071)	0.165 (0.662)	-11.555** (5.463)
Cycle <sup>2</sup>			15.028** (5.797)
Orthogonal Polynom (p-value)			p<0.05
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Decade Fixed-Effects	✓	✓	✓
<b>Robustness of (Non-) Significance of Interaction Term</b>			
Cluster Robust SE	✓	✓	✓
Pairs Cluster Bootstrapped SE	✓	✓	✓

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Robustness of interaction effect: pairs cluster bootstrapped SE to account for small cluster size.

To the extent that the European vote share is a proxy for the organisational benefits that parties receive from representation in the European Parliament, the cyclical effect should dis-

<sup>16</sup>The respective linear or quadratic cycle specifications, which did not find empirical support in the main analysis are omitted from the table. When considered, they all yield insignificant results.

appear in table 2. The statistically significant quadratic term, however, indicates that these cartel theoretical arguments alone cannot account for the electoral spillover of populist radical right success to the domestic arena, strengthening the argument of a second-order driven political momentum for the populist radical right across Europe.

The conservative test of predicting national gains of these party actors only as a function of the temporal proximity to the EP contest, irrespective of their actual performance therein, also indicates that the *event* of the EP election in itself seemingly augments the electoral prospects for populist radical right parties. When the European campaigns coincide with the national electoral campaigns, the salience of Europe in domestic politics accentuates radical right actors' electoral gains, suggesting that such domestic contests are particularly favourable for increasing the radical right's mobilisation on anti-EU stances (Beaudonnet and Franklin 2016) and 'pulling voters' who might not have supported them on the basis of their left/right concerns (Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004, p. 47). Electoral timing of the national election within the European electoral cycle seems to play an important role in domestically politicising EU matters by offering party actors who represent both the anti-European views of many voters and the (sometimes therewith coinciding) authoritarian-nationalistic attitudes of other voters a permeable forum to make these issues salient.

## 5. Conclusions

Only recently van der Brug and de Vreese (2016) contended that the European direct elections are not working as elections 'are supposed to perform', merely leaving the Union just with the intended consequences of these elections. Following the seminal work of Reif and Schmitt (1980), there is a voluminous literature on the character of the supranational contest, the voting calculus, and the policy issues involved therein. While this research substantially contributes to advancing our understanding of how Europe is gradually becoming politicised, and whether mostly domestic or mostly European considerations shape the supranational electoral outcomes, 'in reality, we find influences running in both directions' (van der Eijk et al. 1996) and the secondary elections themselves impinge on *domestic* party systems.

Hence, the contribution of this paper is twofold: by changing the focus to the national arena, it firstly shows that the direct second-order elections have important 'first-order' consequences. While anecdotal evidence holds that the EP elections provided parties like Front Nationale, the Sweden Democrats or Podemos with the first favourable opportunity for gaining momentum and translating their success into national power (DeClair 1999, p. 59; Andeweg 1995, p. 75; Cordero and Montero 2015), the present analysis is the first to systematically analyse such 'first-order effects' across all European member states.

Second, it disentangles the mechanisms behind these electoral spillover effects, corroborating the idea that populist radical right parties not only benefit from an immediate marker-set of EP success (as populist radical left parties do) and from a possible enhanced organisational

strength, but that also the salience of European integration augments their electoral prospects if national and European election are held temporally proximate to each other. Relying on aggregate electoral data, the precise underlying micro-level mechanisms responsible for this ‘first-order effect’ remain to be explored.

A thorough analysis thereof is impeded by the lack of individual-level panel data to assess how – and whether – individuals who turn out for a small or radical party in the EP elections are also more likely to cast a similar ‘habitual’ ballot in the following national contest. Notably, Dinas and Riera (2015) show that individuals whose first electoral participation (in terms of eligibility) was a European second-order election are more likely to support a small party than individuals whose first election was a national election. While the latter group of individuals becomes ‘imprinted’ with a strategic voting calculus, which dominates the national arena, the former group of individuals is less strongly pressured by these strategic considerations. Their first voting calculus is sticky and persists into future electoral choices (Dinas and Riera 2015). In light of the comparatively low turnout levels in EP elections, these habitual voting patterns alone can, however, most likely not fully account for the electoral spillover of populist radical right success. The experimental evidence from the bandwagon literature in the U.S. (see section 2) and the empirical results on a genuine momentum effect (section 4.2) rather support the idea that also individuals who themselves did not participate in the European contest are encouraged to cast a ballot for a populist radical right party after its success in the supranational arena. This hypothesis should be empirically addressed by future research.

The salience of European integration seems decisive in explaining the populist right spillover effects to the domestic arena – and this salience is augmented when the first-order election occurs in close temporal proximity to the second-order contest. Neither green nor populist radical left actors are able to similarly capitalise on European success. This is an indication that not only the populist radical rights’ nationalistic policy agenda – targeted at the strictly demarcated first-order boundaries of nation states – matters for the second-order spillover. The increased attention to their – in Western Europe mostly still socially in-tolerated – anti-immigrationist demands and a possible legitimacy increase thereof following European success seemingly also accentuates domestic electoral support. Future research is needed to explore these arguments in detail.

While populist radical right actors do play a part in politicising Europe (Hutter and Grande 2014), they are also among the ones most hostile towards further European integration (Dolezal and Hellstroem 2016; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012; Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007). In view of their opposition to an integrative Europe, it seems almost paradoxical that precisely for those adversaries, the European elections serve as a springboard to the national arena.

As inequitable this may appear, it is important to note that some of the political architects of the universal and direct EP elections had a remarkably clear idea about such inherent risks for further European integration and their potential impact on domestic politics. In the early discussions about the institutional design of direct elections, some parliamentarians not

only raised their voice against this measure, being afraid that some ‘irreducible’ opponents to the European project might use the elections to undermine the European spirit, and calling for mechanisms to limit their influence in an elected parliament (Commission des Affaires Politiques et des Questions Institutionnelles 1959, p. 20). There was also strong criticism that arousing the public for direct elections without a substantial increase in the Assembly’s powers, would create frightful and inevitable disenchantment among the European public and ultimately spark a backlash against the European democratic idea (Commission des Affaires Politiques et des Questions Institutionnelles 1960a,b,c). Yet, these critics were the minority: when the ‘Working Party on European Elections’ presented their proposed Draft Convention to the European Parliament in May 1960, the MEPs almost unanimously voted in favour of adopting it. Only a handful of MEPs disapproved of the draft convention, which should only in 1975 (in a substantially similar format) finally become adopted by the actual legislative organ of the EU, the Council of the European Communities. In the debate prior to the Assembly’s vote, one of the sceptics, the German Social Democrat Ludwig Metzger, cautioned that demonstrating to voters that ‘free and democratic general elections can be held for something that is basically of minor importance is to set the worst possible example’ (Commission des Affaires Politiques et des Questions Institutionnelles 1960c). We might wonder then, why were the founders of the direct elections so foolish to introduce the elections prematurely? In his speech, Metzger went further: ‘We want European elections and we want them to be direct. [...] But what is it we want to elect, and for what purpose? [...] Some people are so fascinated by the idea of direct European elections that they no longer consider what they are designed to achieve.’

## References

- Andeweg, Rudy (1995). ‘The Reshaping of National Party Systems’. In: *West European Politics* 18(3), pp. 58–78.
- Angrist, Joshua and Jörn-Steffen Pischke (2008). *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion*. Princeton University Press.
- Bakker, Ryan et al. (2015). ‘Measuring Party Positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999–2010’. In: *Party Politics* 21(1), pp. 143–152.
- Bale, Tim (2012). ‘Supplying the Insatiable Demand: Europe’s Populist Radical Right’. In: *Government and Opposition* 47(2), pp. 256–274.
- Bardi, Luciano et al. (2010). *How to Create a Transnational Party System*. EUDO Observatory on Political Parties and Representation (OPPR).
- Bartels, Larry M (1988). *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice*. Princeton University Press.
- Beaudonnet, Laurie and Mark N. Franklin (2016). ‘The Negative Effect of Elections to the European Parliament’. In: *(Un)intended Consequences of EU Parliamentary Elections*. Ed. by Wouter van der Brug and Claes H de Vreese. Oxford University Press, pp. 195–214.
- Bechtel, Michael M (2012). ‘Not Always Second Order: Subnational Elections, National-Level Vote Intentions, and Volatility Spillovers in a Multi-Level Electoral System’. In: *Electoral Studies* 31(1), pp. 170–183.
- Benoit, Kenneth and Michael Laver (2006). *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Bhatti, Yosef, Kasper M Hansen, and Hanna Wass (2016). ‘First-Time Boost Beats Experience: The Effect of Past Eligibility on Turnout’. In: *Electoral Studies* 41, pp. 151–158.
- Bol, Damien et al. (2016). ‘Addressing Europe’s Democratic Deficit: An Experimental Evaluation of the Pan-European District Proposal’. In: *European Union Politics*.
- Bolleyer, Nicole (2009). ‘Inside the Cartel Party: Party Organisation in Government and Opposition’. In: *Political Studies* 57(3), pp. 559–579.
- Bølstad, Jørgen, Elias Dinas, and Pedro Riera (2013). ‘Tactical Voting and Party Preferences: A Test of Cognitive Dissonance Theory’. In: *Political Behavior* 35(3), pp. 429–452.
- Bornschieer, Simon (2010). *Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe*. Temple University Press.
- Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder (2006). ‘Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses’. In: *Political Analysis* 14(1), pp. 63–82.
- Cameron, Colin and Douglas Miller (2015). ‘A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference’. In: *Journal of Human Resources* 50(2), pp. 317–372.
- Cameron, Colin, Jonah Gelbach, and Douglas Miller (2008). ‘Bootstrap-Based Improvements For Inference With Clustered Errors’. In: *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 90(3), pp. 414–427.
- Carey, John and Simon Hix (2011). ‘The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems’. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2), pp. 383–397.
- Carrubba, Cliff and Richard J. Timpone (2005). ‘Explaining Vote Switching Across First- and Second-Order Elections Evidence From Europe’. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 38(3), pp. 260–281.
- Carter, Andrew V, Kevin T Schnepel, and Douglas G Steigerwald (2013). ‘Asymptotic Behavior of a T Test Robust to Cluster Heterogeneity.’ In: *University of California-Santa Barbara. Unpublished*.

- Castles, Francis G. and Peter Mair (1984). 'Left–Right Political Scales: Some "Expert" Judgments'. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 12(1), pp. 73–88.
- Clark, Nick and Robert Rohrschneider (2009). 'Second-Order Elections versus First-Order Thinking: How Voters Perceive the Representation Process in a Multi-Layered System of Governance'. In: *European Integration* 31(5), pp. 645–664.
- Commission des Affaires Politiques et des Questions Institutionnelles (1959). *Réunion du Groupe de Travail sur les Élections Européennes du 31 Janvier 1959*. Historical Archives of the European Union, PE0-3462.
- Commission des Affaires Politiques et des Questions Institutionnelles (1960a). *L'élection de l'APE au suffrage universel (Emilio Battista, Fernand Dehousse, Maurice Faure, Wilhelmus J. Schuijt, Ludwig Metzger)*. Historical Archives of the European Union, PE0-152.
- Commission des Affaires Politiques et des Questions Institutionnelles (1960b). *Reunion des 4 au 8 mars 1960*. Historical Archives of the European Union, PE0-3496.
- Commission des Affaires Politiques et des Questions Institutionnelles (1960c). *Sessions du 10 au 18 Mai 1960*. Historical Archives of the European Union, PE0-3019.
- Converse, Philip E (1969). 'Of Time and Partisan Stability'. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 2(2), pp. 139–171.
- Cordero, Guillermo and José Ramón Montero (2015). 'Against Bipartyism, Towards Dealignment? The 2014 European Election in Spain'. In: *South European Society and Politics* 20(3), pp. 357–379.
- Cox, Gary W. (1997). *Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Curtice, John (1989). 'The 1989 European Election: Protest or Green Tide?' In: *Electoral Studies* 8(3), pp. 217–230.
- Curtice, John (2014). 'Messages from the Voters: The 2014 Local and European Elections'. In: *Juncture* 21(1), pp. 77–81.
- De Boef, Suzanna and Luke Keele (2008). 'Taking Time Seriously'. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (1), pp. 184–200.
- De Vries, Catherine and Erica Edwards (2009). 'Taking Europe to Its Extremes. Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism'. In: *Party Politics* 15 (1), pp. 5–28.
- De Vries, Catherine E., Wouter van der Brug, Marcel H. van Egmond, and Cees van der Eijk (2011). 'Individual and Contextual Variation in EU Issue Voting: The Role of Political Information'. In: *Electoral Studies* 30(1), pp. 16–28.
- De Lange, Sarah L. and David Art (2011). 'Fortuyn Versus Wilders: An Agency-Based Approach to Radical Right Party Building'. In: *West European Politics* 34(6), pp. 1229–1249.
- Decker, Frank and Lazaros Miliopoulos (2009). 'From a Five to a Six-Party System? Prospects of the Right-Wing Extremist NPD'. In: *German Politics & Society* 27(2), pp. 92–107.
- DeClair, Edward (1999). *Politics on the Fringe: The People, Policies, and Organization of the French National Front*. Duke University Press.
- Deschouwer, Kris (2006). 'Political Parties as Multi-Level Organizations'. In: *Handbook of Party Politics*. Ed. by Richard S. Katz and William Crotty. Sage London, pp. 291–300.
- Dimitras, Panayote Elias (1996). 'Greece: A Confused Electorate'. In: *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union*. Ed. by Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 157–165.
- Dinas, Elias (2014). 'Does Choice Bring Loyalty? Electoral Participation and the Development of Party Identification'. In: *American Journal of Political Science*, pp. 449–465.

- Dinas, Elias and Pedro Riera (2015). ‘No Elections for Big Parties: EP Elections and National Party System Fragmentation’. Working Paper.
- Dinas, Elias, Pedro Riera, and Nasos Roussias (2015). ‘Staying in the First League: Parliamentary Representation and the Electoral Success of Small Parties’. In: *Political Science Research and Methods* 3(2), pp. 187–204.
- Dinkel, Reiner (1977). ‘Der Zusammenhang Zwischen Bundes-und Landtagswahlergebnissen’. In: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 18(2/3), pp. 348–359.
- Dolezal, Martin and Johan Hellstroem (2016). ‘The Radical Right as Driving Force in the Electoral Arena?’ In: *Politicising Europe*. Ed. by Swen Hutter, Edgar Grande, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Cambridge University Press, pp. 156–180.
- Döring, Holger and Philip Manow (2016). ‘Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov)’. An Infrastructure for Empirical Information on Parties, Elections and Governments in Modern Democracies. Version.
- Downs, Anthony (1957). ‘An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy’. In: *The Journal of Political Economy*, pp. 135–150.
- Esarey, Justin and Andrew Menger (2016). ‘Practical and Effective Approaches to Dealing with Clustered Data’. Unpublished Manuscript.
- European Election Database (2016). *European Election Database*.
- European Parliament. Directorate General for Research (2014). *Fact Sheets on the European Union – 2015*. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- Farrer, Benjamin (2015). ‘Connecting Niche Party Vote Change in First-and Second-Order Elections’. In: *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 25(4), pp. 482–503.
- Ferrara, Federico (2004). ‘Get Your Act Together: Party Performance in European Parliament Elections’. In: *European Union Politics* 5(3), pp. 283–306.
- Franklin, Mark and Sara Hobolt (2011). ‘The Legacy of Lethargy: How Elections to the European Parliament Depress Turnout’. In: *Electoral Studies* 30(1), pp. 67–76.
- Franklin, Mark, Cees van der Eijk, and Michael Marsh (1996a). ‘Conclusions: The Electoral Connection and the Democratic Deficit’. In: *Choosing Europe?* Ed. by Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 366–390.
- Franklin, Mark, Cees van der Eijk, and Erik Oppenhuis (1996b). ‘The Institutional Context: Turnout’. In: *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union*. Ed. by Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 306–331.
- Gabel, Matthew (2000). ‘European Integration, Voters and National Politics’. In: *West European Politics* 23(4), pp. 52–72.
- Galtung, Johan and Mari Holmboe Ruge (1965). ‘The Structure of Foreign News the Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers’. In: *Journal of Peace Research* 2(1), pp. 64–90.
- Grande, Edgar and Swen Hutter (2016). ‘Is the Giant Still Asleep? The Politicisation of Europe in the National Electoral Arena’. In: *Politicising Europe*. Ed. by Swen Hutter, Edgar Grande, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Cambridge University Press, pp. 90–111.
- Gschwend, Thomas (2009). ‘District Magnitude and the Comparative Study of Strategic Voting’. In: *The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems*. Ed. by Hans-Dieter Klingemann, pp. 289–310.
- Hernández, Enrique and Hanspeter Kriesi (2016). ‘Turning Your Back on the EU. The Role of Eurosceptic Parties in the 2014 European Parliament Elections’. In: *Electoral Studies*.

- Hix, Simon and Michael Marsh (2007). ‘Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections’. In: *Journal of Politics* 69(2), pp. 495–510.
- Hix, Simon and Michael Marsh (2011). ‘Second-Order Effects Plus Pan-European Political Swings: An Analysis of European Parliament Elections Across Time’. In: *Electoral Studies* 30(1), pp. 4–15.
- Hobolt, Sara and James Tilley (2014). ‘Who’s in Charge? How Voters Attribute Responsibility in the European Union’. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 47(6), pp. 795–819.
- Hobolt, Sara and Jill Wittrock (2011). ‘The Second-Order Election Model Revisited: An Experimental Test of Vote Choices in European Parliament Elections’. In: *Electoral Studies* 30(1), pp. 29–40.
- Hobolt, Sara, Jae-Jae Spoon, and James Tilley (2009). ‘A Vote Against Europe? Explaining Defection at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliament Elections’. In: *British Journal of Political Science* 39(1), pp. 93–115.
- Hobolt, Sara, James Tilley, and Susan Banducci (2013). ‘Clarity of Responsibility: How Government Cohesion Conditions Performance Voting’. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 52(2), pp. 164–187.
- Hobolt, Sara B and Catherine de Vries (2016). ‘Turning Against the Union? The Impact of the Crisis on the Eurosceptic Vote in the 2014 European Parliament Elections’. In: *Electoral Studies*.
- Holbrook, Thomas (1996). *Do Campaigns Matter?* Sage Publications.
- Hong, Geeyoung (2015). ‘Explaining Vote Switching to Niche Parties in the 2009 European Parliament Elections’. In: *European Union Politics*, p. 1465116515586428.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole J Wilson (2002). ‘Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?’ In: *Comparative Political Studies* 35(8), pp. 965–989.
- Huber, John and Ronald Inglehart (1995). ‘Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies’. In: *Party Politics* 1(1), pp. 73–111.
- Hutter, Swen and Edgar Grande (2014). ‘Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena: A Comparative Analysis of Five West European Countries, 1970–2010’. In: *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52(5), pp. 1002–1018.
- International Monetary Fund (2016). *World Economic Outlook Database*.
- Irwin, Galen (1995). ‘Second-Order or Third-Rate? Issues in the Campaign for the Elections for the European Parliament 1994’. In: *Electoral Studies* 2(14), pp. 183–199.
- Ivarsflaten, Elisabeth and Froy Gudbrandsen (2011). ‘The Populist Radical Right in Western Europe’. In: *The Europa Regional Surveys of the World 2012*. London: Routledge.
- Iyengar, Shanto, Donald R Kinder, Mark D Peters, and Jon A Krosnick (1984). ‘The Evening News and Presidential Evaluations’. In: *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46(4), p. 778.
- Johnson, Joel and Jessica Wallack (2010). *Database of Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote*. Harvard Dataverse.
- Katz, Richard S. (1999). ‘Representation, the Locus of Democratic Legitimation and the Role of the National Parliaments in the European Union’. In: *The European Parliament, the National Parliaments, and European Integration*. Ed. by Richard S Katz and Bernhard Wessels. Oxford University Press, pp. 21–44.
- Katz, Richard S and Peter Mair (1995). ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The Emergence of the Cartel Party’. In: *Party Politics* 1(1), pp. 5–28.
- Katz, Richard S and Peter Mair (2009). ‘The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement’. In: *Perspectives on Politics* 7(04), pp. 753–766.

- King, Gary and Margaret Roberts (2014). ‘How Robust Standard Errors Expose Methodological Problems They Do Not Fix, And What To Do About It’. In: *Political Analysis*, pp. 1–1.
- Kitschelt, Herbert (1992). ‘The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe’. In: *Politics & Society* 20(1), pp. 7–50.
- Kreuzer, Marcus and Vello Pettai (2003). ‘Patterns of Political Instability: Affiliation Patterns of Politicians and Voters in Post-Communist Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’. In: *Studies in Comparative International Development* 38(2), pp. 76–98.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter et al. (2006). ‘Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared’. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 45(6), pp. 921–956.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter et al. (2008). *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge University Press Cambridge.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter et al. (2012). *Political Conflict in Western Europe*. Cambridge University Press.
- Laver, Michael and Kenneth Benoit (2003). ‘The Evolution of Party Systems Between Elections’. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2), pp. 215–233.
- Leys, Colin (1959). ‘Models, Theories, and the Theory of Political Parties’. In: *Political Studies* 7 (2), pp. 127–146.
- Mair, Peter (2007). ‘Political Opposition and the European Union’. In: *Government and Opposition* 42(1), pp. 1–17.
- Marsh, Michael (1998). ‘Testing the Second-Order Election Model After Four European Elections’. In: *British Journal of Political Science* 28(4), pp. 591–607.
- Marsh, Michael and Mark Franklin. ‘The Foundations: Unanswered Questions from the Study of European Elections, 1979-1994’. In: *Choosing Europe?* Ed. by Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 11–32.
- Massetti, Emanuele and Simon Toubeau (2013). ‘Sailing with Northern Winds: Party Politics and Federal Reforms in Italy’. In: *West European Politics* 36(2), pp. 359–381.
- Minkenberg, Michael and Pascal Perrineau (2007). ‘The Radical Right in the European Elections 2004’. In: *International Political Science Review* 28(1), pp. 29–55.
- Moulton, Brent R (1986). ‘Random Group Effects and the Precision of Regression Estimates’. In: *Journal of Econometrics* 32(3), pp. 385–397.
- Moulton, Brent R (1990). ‘An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate Variables on Micro Units’. In: *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, pp. 334–338.
- Mudde, Cas (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mutz, Diana C (1997). ‘Mechanisms of Momentum: Does Thinking Make It So?’ In: *The Journal of Politics* 59(1), p. 104.
- Oppenhuis, Erik, Cees van der Eijk, and Mark Franklin (1996). ‘The Party Context’. In: *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union*. Ed. by Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 287–305.
- Reif, Karlhein and Herman Schmitt (1997). ‘Second-Order Elections’. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 31(1-2), pp. 109–124.
- Reif, Karlhein (1984). ‘National Electoral Cycles and European Elections 1979 and 1984’. In: *Electoral Studies* 3(3), pp. 244–255.

- Reif, Karlheinz and Hermann Schmitt (1980). ‘Nine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results’. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 8(1), pp. 3–44.
- Roßteutscher, Sigrid, Ina Bieber, and Philipp Scherer (2014). ‘Voting Complexity in a Multilayered System’. In: *Voters on the Move or on the Run?* Ed. by Bernhard Wessels, Hans Rattinger, Sigrid Rossteutscher, and Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck. Oxford University Press, USA, pp. 88–114.
- Sartori, Giovanni (1968). ‘Political Development and Political Engineering’. In: *Public Policy*. Ed. by J. D. Montgomery and A. O. Hirschman. Harvard University, John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government: Publications. John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, pp. 261–298.
- Schakel, Arjan H. (2013). ‘Congruence Between Regional and National Elections’. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 46(5), pp. 631–662.
- Schmitt, Hermann and Renato Mannheimer (1991). ‘About Voting and Non-Voting in the European Elections of June 1989’. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 19(1), pp. 31–54.
- Schmitt, Hermann and Ilke Toygür (2016). ‘European Parliament Elections of May 2014: Driven by National Politics or EU Policy Making?’ In: *Politics and Governance* 4(1), pp. 167–181.
- Schmitt, Hermann and Cees van der Eijk (2007). ‘Non-Voting in European Parliament Elections and Support for European Integration’. In: *European Elections & Domestic Politics: Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future*. Ed. by Cees van der Eijk and Wouter van der Brug. University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 145–167.
- Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger (1996). ‘Mass Media, the Electorate, and the Bandwagon. A Study of Communication Effects on Vote Choice in Germany’. In: *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 8(3), pp. 266–291.
- Schulze, Heidi (2016). ‘The Spitzenkandidaten in the European Parliament Election Campaign Coverage 2014 in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom’. In: *Politics and Governance* 4(1).
- Spoon, Jae-Jae (2011). *Political Survival of Small Parties in Europe*. University of Michigan Press.
- Struller, Jakob (2014). *Mit Lucke, ohne Europa*. URL: <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/europawahlkampf-afd-mit-lucke-ohne-europa/9828612-7.html> (visited on 01/20/2016).
- Tavits, Margit (2008). ‘On the Linkage Between Electoral Volatility and Party System Instability in Central and Eastern Europe’. In: *European Journal of Political Research* 47(5), pp. 537–555.
- Toubeau, Simon and Markus Wagner (2015). ‘Explaining Party Positions on Decentralization’. In: *British Journal of Political Science* 45 (01), pp. 97–119.
- Trechsel, Alexander, Lorenzo de Sio, and Diego Garzia (2015). *Ist die Zeit Reif(f)? 2014 as the First (Truly) European Elections*. Under Review.
- Van Biezen, Ingrid and Ekaterina R Rashkova (2014). ‘Deterring New Party Entry? The Impact of State Regulation on the Permeability of Party Systems’. In: *Party Politics* 20(6), pp. 890–903.
- Van Egmond, Marcel (2007). ‘European Elections as Counterfactual National Elections’. In: *European Elections & Domestic Politics. Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future*. Ed. by Wouter van der Brug and Cees van der Eijk. Contemporary European Politics and Society. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 32–50.

- Van der Brug, Wouter and Claes H de Vreese (2016). 'Introduction'. In: *(Un) intended Consequences of EU Parliamentary Elections*. Ed. by Wouter van der Brug and Claes H de Vreese. Oxford University Press, pp. 1–16.
- Van der Brug, Wouter et al. (2007). 'European Elections, Domestic Politics, and European Integration'. In: *European Elections & Domestic Politics. Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future*. Ed. by Wouter van der Brug and Cees van der Eijk. Contemporary European Politics and Society. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 226–261.
- Van der Eijk, Cees and Mark N Franklin (2004). 'Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National Elections in Europe'. In: *European Integration and Political Conflict*. Ed. by Gary Marks and Marco R Steenbergen. Cambridge University Press, pp. 32–50.
- Van der Eijk, Cees and Wouter van der Brug (2007). 'Introduction: Electoral Politics in the European Union and the 2004 Enlargement'. In: *European Elections & Domestic Politics: Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future*. Ed. by Cees van der Eijk and Wouter van der Brug. University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 1–12.
- Van der Eijk, Cees, Mark Franklin, and Michael Marsh (1996). 'What Voters Teach Us About Europe-Wide Elections: What Europe-Wide Elections Teach Us About Voters'. In: *Electoral Studies* 15(2), pp. 149–166.
- Weber, Till (2009). 'When The Cat Is Away The Mice Will Play: Why Elections to The European Parliament are About Europe After All'. In: *Politique Européenne* 28(2), pp. 53–71.
- Weber, Till (2011). 'Exit, Voice, and Cyclicity: A Micrologic of Midterm Effects in European Parliament Elections'. In: *American Journal of Political Science* 55(4), pp. 907–922.
- White, Halbert (1980). 'A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Eestimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity'. In: *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, pp. 817–838.
- Wooldridge, Jeffrey (2010). *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*. Vol. 2. MIT Press.
- Zech, Charles E. (1975). 'Leibenstein's Bandwagon Effect as Applied to Voting'. In: *Public Choice* 21, pp. 117–122.

## A. Parties in the Analysis

Table 3: Parties in the analysis

Country	Party	Abbr.
<b>Populist Radical Left</b>		
Austria	Communist Party of Austria	KPO
Belgium	Communist Party	KPB-PCB
Belgium	Workers' Party of Belgium	PA-PTB
Cyprus	Progressive Party of Working People	AKEL
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	KSCM
Denmark	Common Course	FK
Denmark	Communist Party of Denmark	DKP
Denmark	Left Socialists	VS
Denmark	People's Movement against the EU	Fobe
Denmark	Red-Green Alliance	En-O
Finland	Communist Party of Finland (Unity)	SKP-Y
Finland	Democratic Union — Left Alliance	DL—VAS
France	Alliance of the Overseas	AO
France	Citizens' Movement	MDC
France	Party of Presidential Majority	MP
France	Revolutionary Communist League	LCR
France	Unified Socialist Party	PSU
France	Workers' Struggle	LO
France	other far-left	ex-gau
Germany	Peace alliance	Fr
Germany	The Left / PDS	Li/PDS
Greece	Communist Party of Greece	KKE
Greece	Communist Party of Greece (Interior)	KEE(I)
Greece	Democratic Social Movement	DIKKI
Greece	Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left	AASA
Greece	Popular Unity	LE
Greece	United Democratic Left	EDA
Hungary	Hungarian Workers' Party	MMP
Ireland	Democratic Left	DLP
Ireland	People Before Profit Alliance	PBPA
Ireland	Sinn Fein The Workers' Party	SFWP
Ireland	Socialist Party	SP
Ireland	United Left Alliance	ULA
Italy	Anticapitalist List	LA
Italy	Civil Revolution	RC
Italy	Communist Refoundation Party	PRC
Italy	Five Star Movement	M5S
Italy	Left (Ecology) Freedom	SL
Italy	Party of the Italian Communists	PdCI
Italy	Proletarian Democracy	DP
Italy	Proletarian Unity Party	PdUP
Latvia	For Human Rights in a United Latvia	PCTVL
Latvia	Socialist Party of Latvia	LSP
Lithuania	Lithuanian Russian Union	LRS
Lithuania	Socialist People's Front	SPF
Luxembourg	Communist Party of Luxembourg	KPL
Luxembourg	The Left	DL
Netherlands	Communist Party of the Netherlands	CPN
Netherlands	Pacifist Socialist Party	PSP

Table 3: Parties in the analysis (continued)

Country	Party	Abbr.
Netherlands	Socialist Party	SP
Portugal	Bloc of the Left	BE
Portugal	Communist Party of the Portuguese Workers	PCTP/MRPP
Portugal	Popular Democratic Union	UDP
Portugal	Revolutionary Socialist Party	PSR
Portugal	Unified Democratic Coalition	CDU
Slovakia	99 Percent – Civic Voice	.99
Slovakia	Communist Party of Slovakia	KSS
Slovakia	Law and Justice	PaS
Slovenia	United Left	ZdLe
Spain	Basque Left	EE
Spain	In Common We Can	ECP
Spain	In Tide	EM
Spain	It is time	EeM
Spain	United Left — Communist Party	IU—PCE
Spain	United People	HB
Spain	We Can	P
Spain	Workers' Party of Spain – Communist Unity	PTE-UC
Sweden	Left Party (Communists)	V
United Kingdom	NO2EU – Yes to Democracy	NO2EU
United Kingdom	Sinn Fein	SF
United Kingdom	Socialist Labour Party	SLP
<b>Green Parties</b>		
Austria	The Greens – The Green Alternative	Gruene
Belgium	Agalev – Green	AGL-Gr
Belgium	Confederated Ecologists for the Organisation of Original Struggles	Ecolo
Bulgaria	New Times	NV
Cyprus	Ecological and Environmental Movement	KOP
Czech Republic	Green Party	SZ
Denmark	Greens	Gron
Denmark	Socialist Peoples Party	SF
Denmark	The Alternative	A
Estonia	Estonian Greens	EER
Finland	Ecological Party	Eko
Finland	Green League	VIHR
France	Ecology Generation	GE
France	Greens	V
France	other ecologists	eco
Germany	Alliance 90 / Greens	B90/Gru
Germany	Alliance 90 – Citizens' Movement	B90/Gr
Greece	Alternative Ecologists	OE
Greece	Ecologist Greens	OP
Greece	Greek Democratic Ecological Movement	EDOK
Hungary	Dialogue for Hungary	PM
Hungary	Politics Can Be Different	LMP
Ireland	Green Party	Green
Ireland	Independent – Luke Flanagan	I-LF
Italy	Federation of the Greens	FdV
Italy	Green Lists	FdLV
Italy	Rainbow Greens	VA
Luxembourg	Green Alternative	GAP
Luxembourg	Green Left Ecological Initiative	GLEI
Luxembourg	Green and Liberal Alliance	GLA

Table 3: Parties in the analysis (continued)

Country	Party	Abbr.
Luxembourg	The Greens	Greng
Malta	Democratic Alternative	AD
Netherlands	GreenLeft	GL
Netherlands	Radical Political Party	PPR
Netherlands	The Greens	Groen
Portugal	Earth Party	MPT
Portugal	Party for Animals and Nature	PAN
Slovakia	Green Party	SZS
Slovenia	Dream Job	SS
Slovenia	Youth Party of Slovenia	SMS
Spain	Confederation of the Greens	CV
Spain	Europe of the People – The Greens	EP-V
Spain	Greens Ecologists	LVE
Sweden	Greens	MP
United Kingdom	Green Party	GP
<b>Populist Radical Right</b>		
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZO
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	FPO
Belgium	Flemish Block	VB
Belgium	National Front	FN
Bulgaria	Attack	Ataka
Bulgaria	IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement	VMRO
Bulgaria	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	NFSB
Cyprus	National Popular Front	ELAM
Czech Republic	Sovereignty – Jana Bobosikova Bloc	S-JB
Czech Republic	Workers’ Party of Social Justice	DSSS
Denmark	Danish Peoples Party	DF
Estonia	Future Estonia — Independence	TEE
France	National Front	FN
France	National Republican Movement	MNR
Germany	Alternative for Germany	AfD
Germany	German People’s Union	DVU
Germany	National Democratic Party	NPD
Germany	The Republicans	Rep
Greece	Independent Greeks	AE
Greece	Peoples Association – Golden Dawn	LS-CA
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	LAOS
Hungary	Hungarian Justice and Life Party	MIEP
Hungary	Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary	Jobbik
Italy	Fiamma Tricolore	MSFT
Italy	North League	LN
Latvia	All For Latvia!	VL
Latvia	National Alliance / For Fatherland and Freedom / LNNK	NA/TB/LNNK
Lithuania	Young Lithuania	JL
Luxembourg	Alternative Democratic Reform Party	AR—ADR
Luxembourg	National Movement	NB
Netherlands	Centre Democrats	CD
Netherlands	Centre Party	CP
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	PVV
Poland	League of Polish Families	LPR
Romania	Greater Romania Party	PRM
Slovakia	Slovak National Party	SNS
Slovenia	Slovenian National Party	SNS

Table 3: Parties in the analysis (continued)

Country	Party	Abbr.
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	SD
United Kingdom	British National Party	BNP

## B. Results

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD.	p25	p50	p75	Min.	Max.
$\Delta$ National Vote (Radical Left)	174	0.11	4.07	-1.23	0.00	1.50	-11.70	27.84
EP Vote (Radical Left)	174	6.20	6.98	0.00	4.62	8.48	0.00	34.90
Prev. Government (Radical Left)	174	0.01	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
$\Delta$ National Vote (Green)	174	0.57	2.23	0.00	0.00	1.45	-6.10	7.64
EP Vote (Green)	174	5.15	5.11	0.00	3.39	9.10	0.00	19.91
Prev. Government (Green)	174	0.04	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
$\Delta$ National Vote (Radical Right)	174	1.00	4.36	0.00	0.00	1.50	-11.89	18.23
EP Vote (Radical Right)	174	4.22	5.97	0.00	1.09	6.80	0.00	29.82
Prev. Government (Radical Right)	174	0.05	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
EP Electoral Cycle	174	0.44	0.28	0.19	0.45	0.66	0.00	0.98
EP District Magnitude (Log.)	174	2.78	0.96	2.08	2.77	3.22	0.00	4.60
EP Threshold	174	1.81	2.26	0.00	0.00	5.00	0.00	5.80
District Magnitude (Log.)	174	2.24	1.18	1.69	2.31	2.71	0.00	5.01
Number of Country's EP Elections	174	3.56	2.12	2.00	3.00	5.00	1.00	8.00
Midterm EP Election	174	0.32	0.47	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00
Unemployment	174	8.97	4.68	5.98	7.90	10.43	0.72	25.00
1st EP Decade	174	0.17	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
2nd EP Decade	174	0.20	0.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
3rd EP Decade	174	0.31	0.46	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00
4th EP Decade	174	0.32	0.47	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00

Table 5 displays the marginal effect of the European vote share conditional on the exact position within the European cycle (in distances of 0.1, which corresponds to roughly half a year), starting from concurrent EP and national elections (cycle=0) to the occurrence of national elections right before the next EP election at the very end of the cycle (cycle=0.9). As the marginal effect of interest (EP vote share on the NE vote share  $\frac{\partial Y}{\partial X}$ ) and its standard error is conditional on the position within the cycle ( $C$ )<sup>17</sup>, the table also reports the confidence intervals around the point estimates.

Table 5: Marginal effects of EP vote share on difference to previous national result along the European cycle with confidence intervals

Cycle	Populist Radical Left		Green Parties		Populist Radical Right	
	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic
0	0.532	0.558	0.281	0.373	0.604	0.915
	[0.359; 0.704]	[0.343; 0.772]	[0.124; 0.438]	[0.187; 0.559]	[0.393; 0.815]	[0.623; 1.208]
0.1	0.495	0.503	0.262	0.299	0.57	0.706
	[0.338; 0.653]	[0.339; 0.668]	[0.117; 0.408]	[0.149; 0.449]	[0.379; 0.761]	[0.499; 0.914]
0.2	0.458	0.453	0.244	0.239	0.536	0.543
	[0.313; 0.604]	[0.306; 0.601]	[0.108; 0.38]	[0.104; 0.375]	[0.36; 0.711]	[0.375; 0.712]
0.3	0.422	0.408	0.226	0.194	0.501	0.427
	[0.284; 0.559]	[0.257; 0.558]	[0.098; 0.353]	[0.061; 0.327]	[0.336; 0.666]	[0.263; 0.59]
0.4	0.385	0.366	0.207	0.162	0.467	0.357
	[0.252; 0.519]	[0.209; 0.523]	[0.085; 0.329]	[0.029; 0.296]	[0.306; 0.628]	[0.189; 0.525]
0.5	0.348	0.329	0.189	0.145	0.433	0.333
	[0.214; 0.483]	[0.17; 0.488]	[0.07; 0.308]	[0.015; 0.275]	[0.269; 0.597]	[0.164; 0.502]
0.6	0.312	0.296	0.171	0.142	0.399	0.356
	[0.172; 0.452]	[0.14; 0.452]	[0.051; 0.29]	[0.018; 0.265]	[0.225; 0.572]	[0.187; 0.524]
0.7	0.275	0.267	0.152	0.153	0.364	0.425
	[0.125; 0.425]	[0.114; 0.421]	[0.03; 0.274]	[0.031; 0.274]	[0.175; 0.553]	[0.24; 0.61]
0.8	0.238	0.243	0.134	0.178	0.33	0.54
	[0.075; 0.401]	[0.077; 0.409]	[0.006; 0.261]	[0.042; 0.314]	[0.122; 0.539]	[0.301; 0.78]
0.9	0.202	0.223	0.116	0.217	0.296	0.702
	[0.023; 0.38]	[0.016; 0.43]	[-0.02; 0.251]	[0.039; 0.395]	[0.065; 0.527]	[0.364; 1.041]

95% confidence intervals in brackets.


<sup>17</sup>This standard error is given by  $\hat{\delta}_{\frac{\partial Y}{\partial X}} = \sqrt{\text{var}(\hat{\beta}_1) + C^2 * \text{var}(\hat{\beta}_3) + 2C * \text{covar}(\hat{\beta}_1, \hat{\beta}_3)}$  (Brambor et al. 2006, p. 8).



## C. Robustness

### Jackknife Analysis


Figure 7: Marginal effects of EP vote share at 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of cycle variable. Jackknife technique of 38 populist radical right parties in the analysis.



Jackknife procedure reruns the analysis while omitting one party at a time. 25th percentile of cycle = 0.19, 50th percentile of cycle = .45, 75th percentile of cycle = 0.66.

## Party-Fixed Effects Analysis

Figure 9: Party fixed-effects analysis. Marginal effect of populist radical right parties' vote share in national election on subsequent national vote share conditional on position of the national election within the European cycle



## Robust Standard Errors for Small Sample of Clusters

In a TSCS framework, the observations within the clusters (i.e. countries) cannot be assumed to be independent of each other. Therefore, the default OLS standard errors that ignore the clustering within the data might underestimate the size of the standard errors – thus, leaving researchers overconfident with the interpretation of the results (Moulton 1986, 1990). Consequently, scholars have widely applied cluster-robust standard errors – i.e. the heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors of OLS models proposed by White (1980) – to the estimates of their TSCS data (Cameron et al. 2008). As Angrist and Pischke and Cameron et al. however show, these standard errors themselves might (non-asymptotically) be downward biased when the number of clusters is very small. This is because the so-called Huber-White/sandwich estimator (White 1980) is based on the assumption that the cluster size  $G \rightarrow \infty$  (and not the number of observations within each cluster).

Consequently, when applying the cluster-robust standard errors to regression results in which the error terms cannot be assumed to be independent within clusters, researchers might also be overconfident about the uncertainty of their estimates<sup>18</sup> – hence, in the words of King and Roberts these cluster-robust standard errors ‘expose problems they don’t fix’ (King and Roberts 2014). While it is hard to determine the precise minimum numbers of clusters needed to obtain unbiased standard errors with the ‘classical’ heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, previous studies and Monte Carlo simulations indicate that any cluster size below the size of 40 is likely to be too small (Cameron and Miller 2015; Cameron et al. 2008; Carter et al. 2013). King and Roberts (2014) and Esarey and Menger (2016) replicate recent political science articles, showing that the authors’ inferences are largely invalid when accounting for both the clustering in the data and the small cluster size  $G$  that prohibits the application of

<sup>18</sup>As Monte Carlo simulations by Cameron et al. show, the rejection rate of a true null hypothesis (false positive rate) is also higher for unbalanced clusters than for balanced clusters.

the asymptotically valid Gaussian t-statistic.

To ensure the robustness of the results, this paper corrects for a potential bias of the cluster-robust standard errors by following the suggested procedure of Esarey and Menger (2016) and calculates so-called pairs cluster bootstrapped standard errors (R-package `clusterSEs`).