Day 1: Monday 18 June

9:15 -9:45   Registration – Foyer
9:45 -10:00  Welcome – Room A25
10:00 -11:00 Invited session – Room A25: Torsten Persson (IIES and CIFAR)
11:15 -12:45 Parallel sessions
   a) Voting behaviour and economic change – Room A26
       Ben Lockwood (University of Warwick): Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion (James Rockey, University of Leicester)
       Nikolas Schöll (Universitat Pompeu Fabra): From Job Polarization to Political Discontent? The Political Implications of Technological Change (Aina Gallego, Barcelona Institute of International Studies, and Thomas Kürer, Zurich University)
       Kate Orkin (University of Oxford): Everybody loves a winner: A field experiment providing information on polls in South Africa

   b) Political Representation - Room A24
       Francesco Lancia (University of Salerno and CSEF): Youth Enfranchisement, Political Responsiveness, and Education Expenditure: Evidence from the U.S
       Cecilia Testa (University of Nottingham): Political Participation Black and White: the effect of the Voting Rights Act (Andrea Bernini, University of Nottingham and Giovanni Facchini, University of Nottingham)
Konstantinos Matakos (King’s College London): Lucky Strike: MP Status and Electoral Success and Survival (Elias Dinas, EUI and Oxford)

c) Public Administration - Room A06

Don S. Lee (University of Nottingham): How does presidential impeachment affect intergovernmental relations? Governors' party affiliations and local bureaucrats' attitude change


Daniel Tanis (University of Cambridge): Compliance shocks under low bureaucratic capacity

12:45-13:30 Lunch – Foyer

13:30 -14:30 Invited session – A25: Raymond Duch (Oxford)

14:40 -16:10 Parallel sessions

a) Public policy and politicians – Room A26


Maria Carreri (New York University/UCSD): Can Good Politicians Compensate for Bad Institutions? Evidence from an Original Survey of Italian Mayors

Nelson A. Ruiz (ETH Zurich / London School of Economics): The power of money. The consequences of electing a donor funded politician.

b) Public policy and immigration – Room A24

Sergi Pardos-Prado (University of Oxford): Immigration Policy and Migrants’ Political Integration (Carla Xena, Open University of Catalonia)

Francesc Amat (University of Barcelona): Inequality, Immigration and Party Strategies (Hector Galindo-Silva, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)

Facundo Albornoz (University of Nottingham): Hate and Antisocial Crime around the Brexit referendum (Silvia Sonderegger, University of Nottingham and Jake Bradley, University of Nottingham)

c) Theory I - Room A06

Javier Rivas (University of Bath): Lobbying, Campaign Contributions and Political Competition

Kirill Pogorelskiy (University of Warwick): News We Like to Share: How News Sharing on Social Networks Influences Voting Outcomes (Matthew Shum, Caltech)
Scott Moser (University of Nottingham): Houses in Motion: Bicameralism and Partisan Coordination (Jonathan Lewallen, University of Tampa)

16:10-16:40 Coffee break – Foyer
16:40 -17:40 Invited session – A25: David Lewis (Vanderbilt)
19:00 Conference Dinner - More information to follow

Day 2: Tuesday 19 June
9:00 -10:30 Parallel sessions

a) Political information – Room A26
Nicole Baerg (University of Essex): Central bank communication and public opinion on economic indicators (Dominik Duell, University of Essex and Will Lowe, Princeton University)
Mark Pickup (Simon Fraser University): Political Opinion Leaders and Normative Change: A Trump Effect across the Canada/US Border? (Erik Kimbrough, Chapman University and Clifton van der Linden, Vox Pop Labs)
Michela Redoano (University of Warwick): Politics in the Facebook Era. Evidence from the 2016 US Presidential Elections (Federica Liberini, ETH Zurich; Antonio Russo, ETH Zurich and Angel Cueva, Carlos III University de Madrid)

b) Theory II- Room A24
Thomas Groll (Columbia University): Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational Lobbying and the Cost of Policy (Christopher J. Ellis, University of Oregon)
Vincent Anesi (University of Nottingham): Relational Legislating under Adverse Selection
Ascensión Andina-Díaz (Universidad de Málaga): Institutional flexibility, political alternation and middle-of-the-road policies (Francesco Feri, Royal Holloway, University of London and Miguel A. Meléndez Jiménez, Universidad de Málaga)

c) Gender and Politics – Room A06
Alessia Russo (BI Norwegian Business School): Youth Enfranchisement, Political Responsiveness, and Education Expenditure: Evidence from the U.S (Graziella Bertocchi, University of Modena, Arcangelo Dimico, Queen’s University Belfast, and Francesco Lancia, University of Salerno and CSEF)
Mona Morgan-Collins (Durham University): The Electoral Impact of Newly Enfranchised Groups: The Case of Women’s Suffrage in the United States
Emily A West (University of Pittsburgh): Gender, Partisanship and Voting: An Affective Explanation for the Under-Representation of Women
10:30-11:00   Coffee break – Foyer
11:00 -12:00   Invited session – Room A25: **Georgy Egorov (Northwestern)**
12:00 -13:00   Lunch – Foyer
13:00 -14:30   Parallel sessions
   a) Political corruption – Room A26
      Andrew Pickering (University of York): Polarization and Corruption in America
      (Mickael Melki, Paris School of Business)
      Mihaly Fazekas (University of Cambridge): Agency Design and Corruption Risks:
      Procurement in the United States Federal Government (David Lewis, Vanderbilt
      University Tennessee and Carl Dahlström, University of Gothenburg)
      Jan Meyer-Sahling (University of Nottingham): Civil Service Management Practices
      and Work Motivation: Evidence from an Original Survey of 23.000 Public Servants in
      Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe (Kim Sass Mikkelsen, University of
      Southern Denmark and Christian Schuster, UCL)
   b) Historical democratisation- Room A24
      Leandro De Magalhaes (University of Bristol): Wars and the Rise of Parliament
      (Francesco Giovannoni, University of Bristol)
      Chitralekha Basu (University of Barcelona and IPERG): Political Elites and Electoral
      Representation in a Democratizing Era: Evidence from Britain’s House of Commons
      (Carles Boix, Princeton University & IPERG-University of Barcelona and Paulo
      Serodio, University of Barcelona and IPERG)
      Luz Marina Arias (CIDE, Mexico City and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid): How do
      Rulers Rule? Coordination, Coercion and Political Order
   c) Political economy of development- Room A06
      Marina Dodlova (University of Passau, CESifo): Pro-poor or Political Targeting: An
      Analysis of Social Assistance in Developing Countries (Anna Giolbas, University of
      Goettingen, GIGA Hamburg and Jann Lay, University of Goettingen, GIGA Hamburg)
      Francesca R. Jensenius (University of Oslo / Norwegian Institute of International
      Affairs): Privileging one’s own? Voting patterns and politicized spending in India
      (Pradeep Chhibber, UC Berkeley and Senior Visitor at IPERG, University of
      Barcelona.)
      Julien Labonne (University of Oxford): Village Social Network Structures, Electoral
      Competition and Public Goods Provision (Cesi Cruz, University of British Columbia
      and Pablo Querubin, New York University)
14:30-14:45   Break
14:45 -16:00   Invited session and conclusion – Room A25: **Melissa Marschall (Rice)**
Useful information

Conference venue
The conference will be held in the Business School South on Jubilee Campus (building number 7 on the campus map). Registration and coffee will be in the foyer (on A floor of the building) from 9.30am on Monday morning.

Accommodation
Accommodation has been offered to presenters in the Jubilee Conference Centre Hotel (marked on the campus map). The hotel phone number is +44 (0) 115 938 0080 and the website is https://www.phcompany.com/de-ver/jubilee-conference-centre/. Free parking is available at the hotel for guests.

Conference dinner
The conference dinner will take place on Monday 18 June, 7pm at The Pelican Club, Nottingham city centre (http://www.thepelicanclub.co.uk/). A bus will leave from the car park of the Jubilee Conference Centre on Jubilee campus at 6.30pm to take all delegates to the dinner.

Transport
Please visit www.nottingham.ac.uk/about/visitorinformation for travel information.

Bus
A number of bus services run from the city centre to the Jubilee campus. Visit www.travelineeastmidlands.co.uk to create a personalised journey plan and to get maps and more detailed directions. Some bus operators do not give change so make sure you have the correct fare.

There is also a 24 hour Skylink bus service from East Midlands Airport to Nottingham. A further short taxi journey or bus trip would take you to the Jubilee campus. Alternatively, the Skylink does stop at our University Park campus. For details on how to travel from University Park to the Jubilee campus, please visit https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/sustainability/transport/travellingbetweencampuses/travelling-between-campuses.aspx

Trains
The nearest train stations are located in Nottingham City Centre or Beeston. Taxis and buses are available close to both stations.

Taxis
Taxis may be booked over the phone. Some of the local taxi companies are:

- Fast Lane Cabs +44 (0) 115 950 1501
- DG Cars +44 (0) 115 950 0500
- Cable Cars (based in Beeston) +44 (0) 115 922 9229

Other
- ATMS and a small supermarket are available on the Jubilee campus
- Campus Security Reception may be contacted on +44 (0) 115 951 3599
- Emergency Services may be contacted on +44 (0) 115 951 8888
- If you have any other queries, please contact katy.harrison@nottingham.ac.uk
Wifi access

eduroam
Wireless services for visitors from other participating institutions

To connect to the eduroam service whilst at the University of Nottingham, please ensure that your device has been set up correctly before your visit. Your local Campus IT support team should be able to assist with the required configuration.

- You may need to enter your username and password in order to connect to the eduroam service if these credentials are not already cached on your device.
- The user credentials supplied by your device must identify your home institution e.g. xyz@abc.ac.uk would identify user xyz from university abc.
- If you encounter problems, please contact your home institution for assistance.

If your institution does not participate in eduroam, then you can use the UoN-guest wireless service (see below).

Whilst at a participating site, you are bound by our Code of Practice and the acceptable use policy of the site you are visiting. Failure to adhere could result in disciplinary procedures.

The eduroam (UK) policy can be found on the JANET website.

Guest wireless
The University of Nottingham provides short term visitors with free access to the UoN-guest wireless network.

How to connect
1. Make sure the wireless network adapter is activated on your device.
2. If you are in range, your device should automatically connect to the UoN-guest network. If not, find ‘UoN-guest’ in the list of wireless connections available and select this network. If it is not listed - please move the device until you are in range.
3. Open your web browser, then browse to any unsecure website such as www.bbc.co.uk.
4. The UoN-guest wireless login page will appear.
5. If you have already created an account, click the link to log in, otherwise follow the on-screen instructions to register for an account.
6. You will be sent a confirmation email to the email address you registered with. You have ten minutes to read and confirm your access. If you do not validate your account, then it will be deleted and your device will be disconnected.
7. Once you have confirmed your account, disconnect and reconnect, logging in with your account details. You can log in and use the service for seven days before you will need to re-register.

UoN-guest is an open network and does not provide encryption for traffic transmitted or received by connected devices. Security for connections made using the UoN-guest network remains the responsibility of the user and the service is used at your own risk. Please do not enter passwords online when using this network.

If you do not validate your account within the 10 minutes grace period you will be disconnected and need to re-register.
Abstracts

Day 1: Monday 18 June

Invited session – room A25

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Economic Losers, Political Winners: Sweden’s Radical Right</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Torsten Persson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Ernesto Dal Bó (UC Berkley), Frederico Finan (UC Berkley), Olle Folke (Columbia University) and Johanna Rickne (Colombia University)</td>
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Parallel sessions 1

a) Voting behavior and economic change – room A25

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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Ben Lockwood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>James Rockey (University of Leicester)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>This paper makes three contributions. First, it presents some US evidence that voters respond in different ways to positive and negative changes in economic outcomes. Second, we show that this asymmetric response can be modelled as voter loss-aversion relative to the status quo, and we study how this impacts on electoral competition. We show that it has effects which are qualitatively different from incumbency advantage, notably policy rigidity and platform moderation. One further distinct testable implication of loss-aversion is that incumbents adjust less than challengers to &quot;partisan tides&quot; i.e. shifts in voter preferences, and as a result, favorable (unfavorable) preference shifts, from the point of view of the incumbent, intensify (reduce) electoral competition. We find empirical support for these using data from US state legislatures.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>From Job Polarization to Political Discontent? The Political Implications of Technological Change</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Nikolas Schöll</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Aina Gallego (Barcelona Institute of International Studies) and Thomas Kürer (Zurich University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Despite a very lively academic and public debate about the potentially disruptive transformation of workplaces due to digitalization and automation, we know little about the political consequences of technological change. Do citizens in workplaces undergoing rapid digitalization change their political attitudes and behavior? We study the impact of digitalization on the political attitudes of workers in the UK. Unlike previous studies that use occupational data as proxies of risk, we collect indicators of ICT capital stocks at the industry level, a more direct measure of digitalization, and merge them with individual-level panel data from the British Household Panel Study and the Understanding Society surveys between 1997 and 2013. First, we confirm that digitalization produces polarization in labor market</td>
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outcomes between highly and less educated workers. Next, we document similar divergence in political outcomes. Digitalization is associated with higher turnout for highly skilled workers. Among workers with low education levels, digitalization reduces turnout and support for the Labour Party, and increases support for UKIP. Our analyses suggest that the ongoing wave of technological change may be contributing to the increasing political discontent of unskilled workers, the political divergence between urban technological hubs and left-behind territories, and to the rise of protest politics.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Everybody loves a winner: A field experiment providing information on polls in South Africa</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Kate Orkin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>I test for cognitive biases in how voters process information from pre-election polls, in particular whether voters are overly swayed by whether a party is just winning a poll, compared to just losing. I conducted a field experiment with 2,023 low-income registered black voters from Johannesburg in South Africa’s 2016 municipal elections. I provided two treatment groups with information, face-to-face, from two different IPSOS-Mori polls, both predicting a very close race. The polls provide statistically indistinguishable predictions about vote shares, but in one, the challenger party is ahead by a tiny margin; in another, the incumbent party is just ahead. The difference in effect of the two polls is the effect of a party being the narrow leader in a poll, compared to being the narrow loser. In face-to-face survey data from a baseline survey and follow-up surveys after treatment and after the election, voters who learn a party is just winning improve their ratings of party quality, are more likely to support the party, and believe the party will win a higher share of the vote, compared to if they learn that party is barely losing. Supporters of the party just ahead in the polls are 9-11 percentage points more likely to turn out to vote and 12 percentage points more likely to vote for their party; there is no significant effect on turnout or vote choice for voters who find out their party is just behind. These large effects imply voters interpret polls using crude heuristics, rather than updating beliefs accurately, with large effects on behaviour. Incorrect polls or “horse-race” media reporting focusing on poll results may substantially alter rates of turnout and the outcome of elections.</td>
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<th>Title</th>
<th>Youth Enfranchisement, Political Responsiveness, and Education Expenditure: Evidence from the U.S</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Francesco Lancia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>We examine the link between the political participation of the young and fiscal policies in the U.S. The focus is on preregistration laws, which allow the young to register before being eligible to vote. We establish that preregistration shifts state-level government spending toward higher education. The increase is larger when political competition is weaker and inequality higher. Moreover, we document a positive effect of preregistration on state-provided student aid and the number of its recipients.</td>
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Finally, we show that preregistration promotes a de facto youth enfranchisement episode. The results collectively suggest political responsiveness to the needs of the newly-enfranchised constituency.

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<th>Title</th>
<th>Political Participation Black and White: the effect of the Voting Rights Act</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Cecilia Testa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Andrea Bernini (University of Nottingham) and Giovanni Facchini (University of Nottingham)</td>
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**Abstract**

Does holding office enhance the chances of re-election? A voluminous literature in American and comparative politics has used a multitude of methods to shed light on this question. Most of the evidence, however, comes from majoritarian systems, leaving unclear the impact of incumbency advantage in PR systems. We try to fill this gap by making use of an institutional feature that results into quasi-random variation in incumbency status. In particular, we make use of the 50-seat bonus that the electoral system in Greece gifts to the first party since 2007. In a quasi-random sample of districts, at least one of the seats is secured to the first party. Using a difference-in-differences estimator, we estimate the effect being elected as a bonus-MP on the probability of also being a candidate in the next election. We also look at the impact of MP status on electoral success in the coming elections. We find a significant positive effect on both electoral survival and electoral success. We then try to examine whether this effect translates also into a higher likelihood of re-election. We find that this is the case, but only in small-member districts, where personal vote is not dominated by partisan vote. Our results lend credence to theories of intra-party competition in open-list systems and shed light on the individual underpinnings of incumbency advantage in PR systems.

c)  Public administration – room A06

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<th>Title</th>
<th>How does presidential impeachment affect intergovernmental relations?</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Don S. Lee</td>
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**Abstract**

Governors' party affiliations and local bureaucrats' attitude change. Political institutions and contexts are key components of shaping intergovernmental relations. In this article, we examine how local bureaucrats' perceptions of center-local relations change in varying political institutions and contexts. By leveraging a unique setting of presidential impeachment in South Korea, we assess the impact of governors' party affiliations and terms on local bureaucrats' attitude change. We employ a list experiment in which civil servants may or may not choose to incorporate the central government’s preferences into their policy decisions and estimate heterogeneous treatment effects by comparing bureaucrats' responses before and after impeachment. Our sample includes 650 civil servants from 17 provincial governments, gathered as part of a representative survey. We use a stratified sampling method based on the three following stratifications: gender, civil service rank, and recruitment type. About a random half of the sample was presented with our survey experiment before President Park's impeachment on December 9, 2016 and the other half of the sample was presented with the same
experiment after her impeachment. We find that presidential impeachment makes a
distinct impact on local bureaucrats' responsiveness across governors' party
affiliation, controlling for bureaucrats' perceptions of politics and other individual
characteristics. After impeachment, bureaucrats from local governments where
governors are from the president's party maintain a similar level of responsiveness
to the central government. However, bureaucrats whose governors are affiliated
with the opposition party significantly reduce the level of responsiveness to the
central government. We do not find the effect of governors' term length on
bureaucrats' attitude change.
Our findings have important implications for research and intergovernmental
relations regarding how political institutions and contexts affect bureaucratic
accountability and responsiveness.

Title  The Revolving Door for Political Elites: An Empirical Analysis of the Linkages
        between Government Officials' Professional Background and Financial Regulation
Presenter  Elisa Wirsching
Abstract  Regulatory capture of public policy by financial entities, especially via the revolving
door between government and financial services, has increasingly become a subject
of intense public scrutiny. This paper empirically analyses the relation between
public-private career crossovers of high-ranking government officials and financial
policy. Using information based on curriculum vitae of more than 400 central bank
governors and finance ministers from 32 OECD countries between 1973-2005, a new
dataset was compiled including details on officials’ professional careers before as
well as after their tenure and data on financial regulation. Time-series cross-
sectional analyses show that central bank governors with past experience in the
financial sector deregulate significantly more than governors without a background
in finance (career socialisation hypothesis). Using linear probability regressions, the
results also indicate that finance ministers, especially from left-wing parties, are
more likely to be hired by financial entities in the future if they please their future
employers through deregulatory policies during their time in office (career concerns
hypothesis). Thus, although the revolving door effects differ between government
officials, this study shows that career paths and career concerns of policy-makers
matter. Thus, although the revolving door effects differ between government
officials, this study shows that career paths and career concerns of policy-makers
should be taken into account when analysing financial policy outcomes.

Title  Compliance shocks under low bureaucratic capacity
Presenter  Daniel Tanis
Abstract  There is a general consensus on the negative effects of corruption on state capacity
and welfare, but there is little understanding of how anti-corruption initiatives affect
other areas of policy making. This paper frames anti-corruption policies as a
delegation problem and examines the effects of enforcement shocks on
bureaucratic action. As politicians increase the oversight of the bureaucracy to
ensure that their actions are more compliant, bureaucrats react to a higher risk of
punishment and choose safer actions. This model shows, however, that under low
policy capacity an increase in oversight may in fact distance the bureaucratic action
from the political preferences if punishment is highly asymmetrical. I test this
hypothesis using data from the Brazilian random audit programme and detailed
records of municipal spending during 2006-2012. I show that being audited
substantially increases the chances that bureaucrats will face legal sanctions for the
policies they attempt to deliver, but there are no corresponding sanctions for under-
Parallel sessions 2

a) Public policy and politicians – room A26

Invited session – A25

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Is Cheating a National Pastime? Experimental Evidence</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Raymond Duch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>The decision to cheat is a frequent and relatively mundane economic decision that individuals make on a regular basis in their everyday lives. We observe individuals from the U.K., Russia and Chile making multiple cheating decisions in a public goods game. The majority of subjects in each country exhibit stable cheating behaviors: they either cheat maximally all the time; never cheat; or cheat partially all the time. The distribution of these behaviors varies across countries. Some correlates of cheating exhibit considerable stability across three countries: Both ability at a real effort task and selfish behavior in the Dictator Game are strong and consistent predictors of maximal, but not partial, cheating. Those exhibiting a proclivity to cheat in the public goods game are also more likely to cheat in a classic die-rolling game. Treatments aimed at moderating the extrinsic and intrinsic costs of cheating had little, if any, effect on subject behavior.</td>
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<th>Title</th>
<th>Economic Policies of Competent Politicians: An Empirical Assessment</th>
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<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Jaakko Meriläinen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>This paper studies the role of competence in politics. I exploit extensive administrative data on Finnish local politicians to estimate their competence based on their market success. Using survey data on candidates’ policy preferences, I establish a positive correlation between competence and fiscal conservativeness. This finding carries on to the actual policies that the local governments implement. Competent politicians’ representation has a negative effect on the local income tax rate. Moreover, representation of competent politicians leads to improved fiscal sustainability outcomes. To identify the policy effects causally, I exploit exogenous variation generated by close elections between competent and mediocre candidates.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Can Good Politicians Compensate for Bad Institutions? Evidence from an Original Survey of Italian Mayors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Maria Carreri</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Can competent political leaders bring significant policy changes to communities otherwise doomed by “bad” informal institutions? This question has remained unanswered because of the lack of a convincing measure of politicians’ competence. I develop a novel survey technique to overcome this challenge and apply it in interviews to 309 Italian mayors. I study the impact of mayors’ competence on the policies they enact using a difference-in-differences approach. Results show that more competent mayors are associated with better policies but the association is only present in cases where the quality of informal municipal institutions is low. In these municipalities, the election of more competent mayors translates into a more effective use of funds, an increase in long-term investments, and better service provision without an increase in taxes. Results hold across different measures of institutional quality.</td>
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<th>Title</th>
<th>The power of money. The consequences of electing a donor funded politician.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Nelson A. Ruiz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Do privately donor-funded politicians benefit donors disproportionately? This paper examines the impact of electing donor-funded politicians and campaign limits using a regression discontinuity design (RDD), and a novel dataset that uniquely links campaign donors and recipients of public contracts during a mayor’s incumbency period in Colombia. Evidence shows that electing a donor-funded politician more than doubles the probability of donors receiving contracts and donor-funded politicians receiving disciplinary sanctions. Donor contracts are assigned under a minimum value modality where there is less screening, and have a higher price compared to similar non-donor contracts. In order to isolate the effect of donor money, from characteristics associated with being donor funded, arbitrary campaign limits are used in a fuzzy RDD framework. Evidence shows that campaign limits, lead to lower participation of donor funding in campaigns, and as a result reduce the effect of favoring donors with contracts. This paper provides evidence on the impact of money in public procurement, and how campaign limits can diminish its impact.</td>
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b) Public policy and immigration – room A24

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<th>Title</th>
<th>Immigration Policy and Migrants’ Political Integration</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Sergi Pardos-Prado</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Carla Xena (Open University of Catalonia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Which type of immigration policy best fosters immigrants’ political integration? Apart from increasing evidence of the positive effects of naturalization, little is known about the interrelation between border control and integration policies affecting a significant portion of immigrants who are never eligible or decide not to naturalize. Our cross-sectional analysis reveals that inclusive labor market integration policies have positive effects on democratic satisfaction and political trust. Those effects, however, are exacerbated at moderately higher levels of restrictiveness in eligibility and border control. The long-term settlement incentives provided by this 'coconut' type of policy (with a hard surface but a soft inside) outperform all the other policy models. We subsequently focus on the internal validity of this claim by exploiting the timing of the implementation of the 1962</td>
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Commonwealth Act, which dramatically changed the entry rights of immigrants for the first time in post-colonial Britain. Our interrupted-time series and difference-in-differences estimates suggest that migrants affected by the policy substantially increased their levels of democratic satisfaction and political trust, and that these effects are long-term.

Title: Inequality, Immigration and Party Strategies  
Presenter: Francesc Amat  
Co-author(s): Hector Galind-Silva (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)  
Abstract: In this paper we explore how increasing immigration levels affect party strategies. Specifically, we analyse the effect of immigration on parties’ positions over the economic and authoritarian dimensions. We content that the relationship between immigration and party positions crucially depends on the structure of inequality. We present a new theoretical argument according to which, based on a median voter logic, the structure of inequality can explain the conditional relationship between immigration and party strategies. We investigate the mechanism empirically by exploiting a panel dataset at the party-level for OECD democracies over the period 1962-2015. Overall, the paper presents robust empirical evidence that shows that immigration is an important determinant of party strategies but highly conditional to the type of inequality. The results are robust to alternative explanations such as trade exposure and labor market segmentation. Importantly, the results also show that compensatory platforms and authoritarianism are oftentimes complementary responses to rising immigration levels, especially when inequality at the upper-half of the income distribution increases.

Title: Hate and Antisocial Crime around the Brexit referendum  
Presenter: Facundo Albornoz  
Co-author(s): Silvia Sonderegger (University of Nottingham) and Jake Bradley (University of Nottingham)

c) Theory I – room A06

Title: Lobbying, Campaign Contributions and Political Competition  
Presenter: Javier Rivas  
Abstract: We study how lobbying affects political competition and policy outcomes. Two parties compete in an election where each of them can receive support from a lobby in the form of monetary contributions for campaign spending in exchange for a certain position in the political spectrum. The trade-off for the political party is that more campaign spending increases the chances of winning the election but the ideology of the lobby is not aligned with that of the median voter. We study the game played between the lobbies, each of which offers a contract to one party specifying a policy position and a campaign spending contribution, and the parties, each of which decide whether to accept such contract and if not how to compete against the other party. We explore how lobbying and political competition affect polarization, campaign spending and welfare. Our results match and explain empirical findings.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>News We Like to Share: How News Sharing on Social Networks Influences Voting Outcomes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Kirill Pogorelskiy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Matthew Shum (Caltech)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>We study the relationship between news sharing on social media and information aggregation by voting. Our context-neutral laboratory experimental treatments mimic the features of social networks in the presence of media bias to address concerns that voters obtaining their political news via social media may become more polarized in their voting behavior. Our results suggest that these concerns are warranted: subjects selectively share news that is favorable to their party and do not account for biased news signals in their voting decisions. Overall, subjects behave as if news sharing and voting is expressive of their induced partisanship even though by design, their preferences have a common value component. Given these patterns of individual behavior, the welfare implications of social networks reflect the underlying quality of the shared news: with unbiased media, social networks raise collective decision making efficiency, but efficiency deteriorates markedly in the presence of media bias, as news signals become less reliable.</td>
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<th>Title</th>
<th>Houses in Motion: Bicameralism and Partisan Coordination</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Scott Moser (University of Tampa)</td>
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<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Jonathan Lewallen (University of Tampa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Legislatures must balance representation with governance. Scholars and constitutional designers alike have noted bicameralism can help achieve this balance. Within legislatures, political parties must similarly achieve their goals by balancing their governing responsibilities with their preferred issue agendas. When there is more than one chamber, however, the necessity for intra-party coordination presents an additional hurdle, even for a majority party. The 2013 government shutdown dramatically illustrates how different incentives within the same party but across chambers can make coordination difficult. Motivated by the practical necessity for intra-party coordination in the face of inter-chamber bargaining, we ask &quot;how do parties coordinate across chambers?&quot; Specifically, we develop a model in which a chamber’s internal rules (such as procedural rights granted to the minority party and individual legislators) interact with differing electoral cycles to create frictions with a party. The frictions we identify — and hence the effect of bicameralism — is present even if there are no differences in policy preferences between chambers.</td>
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Invited session – room A25

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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Controlling Agency Choke Points: Presidents and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service in the United States</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>David Lewis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>If presidents wish to see their policy priorities implemented, they need control over career executives occupying key decision-making positions. This paper examines the extent to which new presidential administrations marginalize high level career executives and whether political conflict with a new administration drives executives from their positions. Once in office, presidents are more likely to target individuals with whom they conflict and those in important policymaking positions. Turnover is</td>
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also affected by the choices of career executives. Some anticipate conflict and strategically exit before a new president takes office. To assess our theory, we use unique new data that combines individual survey responses with personnel records to analyze the probability that an agency executive departs her position from March 2015 to July 2017. Given our findings that turnover is driven both by presidential marginalization and strategic exit by bureaucrats, we conclude with implications for presidential efforts to control the bureaucracy.

Day 2: Tuesday 19 June

Parallel session 3

a) Political information- room A26

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Central bank communication and public opinion on economic indicators</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Nicole Baerg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Dominik Duell (University of Essex) and Will Lowe (Princeton University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Political institutions increasingly communicate complex economic policy issues to the public by way of press releases or social media. When asked directly, members of the public often report that they do not understand economic policy and find it complicated or unintelligible; this is especially true for monetary policy. Embedding a vignette experiment into three waves of a panel survey on German households, we examine the influence of communications on monetary policy and inflation expectations. We find that households do indeed incorporate sophisticated information from central banks and that numerical information is particularly helpful in lowering the variance around households’ expectations. The power of persuasion found for central banks is not matched by private economic actors. Further treatments illustrate the effect of shorter vs longer and more precise vs vague information on the influence of the central bank on public opinion on monetary policy indicators. In a final manipulation, we investigate the mediating effect of the source of economic news, private sector vs public sector, and test whether trust in governmental or private actors alter responses. Our findings are important for understanding the ways in which governmental and private actors inform (and perhaps misinform) the public on complicated policy issues.</td>
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<th>Title</th>
<th>Political Opinion Leaders and Normative Change: A Trump Effect across the Canada/US Border?</th>
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<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Mark Pickup</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Erik Kimbrough (Chapman University) and Clifton van der Linden (Vox Pop Labs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Injunctive-norms are shared rules of behavior that people expect others to follow and believe others expect them to follow in kind. They reflect shared perceptions of what people ought to do. Since norms are based on expectations of what others believe, they can shift in response to what others do and say. In particular, they can respond to what opinion leaders – highly visible media or political leaders – say or do. For example, there is preliminary evidence that Trump has weakened norms against anti-immigrant attitudes in the US. Our question is whether Trump’s actions and speech have affected norms north of the border and in what direction. Has there been a Trump spillover or backlash effect on norms in Canada? We use a list</td>
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experiment in a national survey to measure three norms: the norm against expressing anti-immigrant attitudes; the norm against uncivil behaviour in politics; the norm against restricting political speech. Respondents are also assigned to one of four treatment/control groups. One group is primed to think about the behaviours that make Trump an unconventional politician; one group is primed to think about what it means to be a Canadian; one group is given both primes; and one group is given no prime. This design allows us to test the effect of priming Trump, Canadian identity and their interaction on three highly relevant norms of behaviour.

**Title**
Politics in the Facebook Era. Evidence from the 2016 US Presidential Elections

**Presenter**
Michela Redoano

**Co-author(s)**
Federica Liberini (ETH Zurich), Antonio Russo (ETH Zurich) and Angel Cueva (Carlos III University de Madrid)

**Abstract**
There are many practitioners, scholars and journalists who think that social media may have significantly contributed to Trump’s victory in the 2016 US Presidential elections. The argument is that internet platforms (like Facebook) are able to exploit extensive quantities of user-generated data and, thanks to sophisticated technologies, allow policy makers to reach voters with personalized messages (political micro-targeting). The aim of this project is to investigate: (i) the extent of the political campaign conducted via Facebook to micro-target voters, as well as, (ii) the effect this campaign had on the behavior of those voters who relied mainly on social media to gather political information.

To address our questions we use an original dataset on Facebook advertising prices, which allows us to proxy the candidates' willingness to target a specific demographic- and ideology-defined audience. We then link this to data on individuals' voting behavior and political preferences collected by ANES for a sample of US citizens, during the 2016 US Presidential political campaign.

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b) **Theory II – room A24**

**Title**
Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational Lobbying and the Cost of Policy

**Presenter**
Thomas Groll

**Co-author(s)**
Christopher J.Ellis (University of Oregon)

**Abstract**
We consider the strategic considerations inherent in legislative subsidies and develop an informational lobbying model with costly policy reforms. In contrast to other models of informational lobbying we focus on the implications of a policymaker's and a lobby's resource constraints for lobbying activities. We allow both a policymaker and a lobby to gather information, and each can either fund or subsidize policy making. Our analysis highlights that legislative subsidies are both chosen strategically by lobbyists, and strategically induced by policymakers, dependent upon the circumstances. These involve which resource constraints bind, the policymaker's prior beliefs, the salience of policy, and the policymaker's expertise and the lobby's expertise or credibility. We also illustrate when an interest group may lobby.
a friendly, opposing, or undecided policymaker. Furthermore, we explain how an interest group may strategically waste resources and when informational lobbying and transfers are complements, substitutes, or independent.

Title          Relational Legislating under Adverse Selection
Presenter     Vincent Anesi

Title          Institutional flexibility, political alternation and middle-of-the-road policies
Presenter     Ascensión Andina-Díaz
Co-author(s)   Francesco Feri (Royal Holloway, University of London) and Miguel A. Meléndez Jiménez (Universidad de Málaga)
Abstract       Empirical observation shows that policies are usually gradually introduced in a society. This paper presents a model of repeated elections that captures this phenomenon, and that allows countries to differ in their institutional flexibility, thus in the speed of implementation of new policies. We show that with gradual implementation of policies there is an incentive for the voters to vote, each election, to a different party. Hence, our model produces equilibria with alternation. In these equilibria, the implemented policies stand midway between the representative voter's position and the elected party's bliss point, with policies polarizing towards the extremes when institutions are either too flexible or too rigid. In this sense, our results suggest a U-shaped relationship between institutional flexibility and policy extremism.

c)  Gender and politics – room A06

Title          Gender Based Preference and Women's Representation
Presenter     Alessia Russo
Co-author(s)   Graziella Bertocchi (University of Modena) Arcangelo Dimico (Queen's University Belfast) and Francesco Lancia (University of Salerno and CSEF)
Abstract       We examine the link between the political participation of the young and fiscal policies in the U.S. The focus is on preregistration laws, which allow the young to register before being eligible to vote. We establish that preregistration shifts state-level government spending toward higher education. The increase is larger when political competition is weaker and inequality higher. Moreover, we document a positive effect of preregistration on state-provided student aid and the number of its recipients. Finally, we show that preregistration promotes a de-facto youth enfranchisement episode. The results collectively suggest political responsiveness to the needs of the newly-enfranchised constituency.

Title          The Electoral Impact of Newly Enfranchised Groups: The Case of Women's Suffrage in the United States
Presenter     Mona Morgan-Collins
Abstract       Did the expansion of women’s suffrage make a dent in electoral politics? And if so, who were the winners and who were the losers of the reforms? I theorize that while women’s suffrage has the potential to sway electoral tides in favor of the newly enfranchised, such effects are conditional on the strength of a social movement that represents women’s interests. A social movement defines the groups’ shared interests and helps to create an active, informed and mobilized pool of voters that can take electoral action to foster their shared policy goals. In testing this argument,
I use evidence from the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in the United States and employ a difference-in-differences approach that exploits the heterogeneity in the proportion of women across counties. I find strong support for the main argument. The findings have important implications for the study of political representation of marginalized groups and for the study of democratization processes.

**Title**
Gender, Partisanship and Voting: An Affective Explanation for the Under-Representation of Women

**Presenter**
Emily A West

**Abstract**
The under-representation of women in political office is historic and persistent in the United States. In addition, there are stark partisan divides even within the strikingly meager ratio of women representatives to their female constituents across the board. One possible explanation for such under-representation is voter bias against female candidates. While voters may prefer shared-gender candidates for either instrumental or affective reasons, if there is a psychological gain from voting according to one’s gender identity, this affective motivation, if stronger among men than among women, could serve to perpetuate the under-representation of women in politics. I employ a self-affirmation treatment within a voting experiment to isolate this psychological payoff. Conducted among partisan men and women, subjects are faced with a trade-off between voting either along identity or policy lines. By substituting for the boost to self-integrity that might otherwise be gained through shared-gender voting, the self-affirmation treatment is shown to reduce in-group voting among men but has no effect among women. An experimental boost to their self-image reduces the probability of preferring the male candidate over the female candidate among men by about 12 percentage points. Specifically, when looking at treatment effect heterogeneity, Republican men are significantly less likely to vote for the male candidate when self-affirmed. Reductions in the extent to which self-worth is tied to one’s attachment to gender identity appear to drive this reduction in shared-gender voting. Finally, while strong for a particular subset of voters, this psychological payoff does not necessarily dominate the role of instrumental payoffs in deciding whether to vote for the male or female candidate, even among Republican men.

Invited session – room A25

**Title**
From Extreme to Mainstream: How Social Norms Unravel

**Presenter**
Georgy Egorov

**Co-author(s)**
Leonardo Bursztyn (University of Chicago) and Stefano Fiorin (UCLA)

**Abstract**
Social norms, usually persistent, can unravel quickly when new public information arrives, such as a surprising election outcome. In our model of strategic communication, senders state their opinion but they can lie to pander to the popular view; receivers thus make less inference about such senders. We test the model’s predictions with two experiments. On the sender’s side, we show via revealed preference that Donald Trump’s rise in popularity and eventual victory increased individuals’ willingness to publicly express xenophobic views. On the receiver’s side, we show that individuals are judged less negatively if they expressed a xenophobic view in an environment where the view is popular.
### Parallel sessions 4

#### a) Political corruption – room A26

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<tr>
<td>Polarization and Corruption in America</td>
<td>Using panel data from the US states, we document a robust negative relationship between state-level government corruption and ideological polarization. This finding is sustained when state polarization is instrumented using lagged state neighbor ideology. We argue that polarization enhances political accountability. Consistent with this thesis federal prosecutorial effort falls and case quality increases with polarization. The effect of polarization is dampened when there are other means of monitoring governments in particular strong media coverage of state politics. Tangible anti-corruption measures including the stringency of state ethics' laws and independent commissions for redistricting are also associated with increased state polarization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agency Design and Corruption Risks: Procurement in the United States Federal Government</td>
<td>Governments in developed countries like the United States spend over one quarter of their budget buying goods and services from suppliers outside the public sector. Given the vast sums involved in the enterprise of procurement, observers have historically worried about the risk of corruption. Some scholars have described how political appointees can funnel funds to key electoral constituencies or to donors and groups connected to political parties. Other scholars have pointed out problems relating to collusion between career civil servants and firms that do business with federal agencies. In this paper, we evaluate how the design of administrative agencies influences corruption risks, focusing on designs that facilitate appointee influence versus designs that limit appointee influence. We describe how both overly politicized and overly insulated designs increase corruption risks but how in doing so encourage different types of corruption. We evaluate these claims using new data on United States government contracts between 2003 and 2015. We find that executive departments and independent regulatory commissions are the most likely to have contracts characterized by single bids, and other contracting red flags such as closed procedures and non-competitive solicitations. We conclude that designs that balance appointee and civil service representation in procurement decisions are the most successful at reducing corruption risks.</td>
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<td>Civil Service Management Practices and Work Motivation: Evidence from an Original Survey of 23.000 Public Servants in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Motivating public employees is a central public management challenge in both OECD and developing countries. Yet, the relationship between civil service management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Andrew Pickering</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Mickael Melki (Paris School of Business)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Mihaly Fazekas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>David Lewis (Vanderbilt University Tennessee) and Carl Dahlström (University of Gothenburg)</td>
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<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Jan Meyer-Sahling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Kim Sass Mikkelsen (University of Southern Denmark) and Christian Schuster (UCL)</td>
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practices and work motivation remains largely unstudied. This is a curious omission. Governments are, arguably, keen to know how distinct recruitment and selection, pay, performance management and career development practices affect the work motivation of their staff. This paper provides such evidence and thus fills this gap. It does so by drawing on an original survey which is, to our knowledge, the largest-ever original survey conducted on work motivation in public sector: a comparable survey with 23,000 public servants in ten countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. The resulting cross-regional data offers unique generalizability advantages over prior studies, which had often narrowed in single countries, with concomitant concerns about external validity in other contexts. Our findings suggest that the effect of civil service management practices is, in part, country-specific and, in part, generalizable. Some practices generically exert positive effects on work motivation, while others do so only in specific country settings.

b) Historical democratisation – room A24

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<th>Title</th>
<th>Wars and the Rise of Parliament</th>
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<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Leandro De Magalhaes</td>
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<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Francesco Giovannoni (University of Bristol)</td>
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<th>Title</th>
<th>Political Elites and Electoral Representation in a Democratizing Era: Evidence from Britain’s House of Commons</th>
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<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Chitralekha Basu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Carles Boix (Princeton University &amp; IPERG-University of Barcelona) and Paulo Serodio (University of Barcelona and IPERG)</td>
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| Abstract                                                                 | The literature on democratization has emphasized and modeled the role of political elites on democratic transitions either as independent actors (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Przeworski 2011) or as agents embedded in a changing economy and social structure (Boix 2003, Afdt and Jensen 2014, Lizzeri and Persicò 2004). However, a potential concern of that broad research agenda is that the preferences and strategies of political elites have been mostly assumed --following rather stylized (formal) models. As a result, we know little about the true nature of their individual preferences (and the overall structure of policy positions). That makes it hard to ascertain the role of political elites in the process of democratization and the extent to which their preferences determined the course of political reforms or were determined, instead, by the latter. |

To address these problems, we perform two tasks in this paper:

1. We map out the evolution of political elite preferences in Britain, considered the paragon of an endogenous, gradual and peaceful transition to full democracy, employing information on how the members of the House of Commons (MPs) voted from the first electoral reform (1832) to the fourth electoral reform (1918). We do so by taking into account the policy content of their votes on three key political issues (extension of the franchise, Church-state relations, trade) that defined 19th-century British politics in a systematic and almost encompassing manner. Following the procedures suggested in Bateman, Clinton and Lapinski (2017), we identify key proposals and votes of final bills over time and, considering them as policy choices in
one spatial dimension, we establish their location in the policy space with respect to the status quo they challenge. Under the assumption that the preferences of legislators followed standard spatial model conventions and that they voted sincerely, we can infer how (some) elites would have voted in votes in which they did not actually participate. Using the augmented roll-call matrix of all actual and imputed votes, we reconstruct, with the aid of well-established ideal point estimation techniques, the structure of the policy space over time, the spatial location of MPs, and a set of polarization measures.

2. We then explore the relationship between the evolution of policy preferences and both UK’s process of economic development (measured through population density, level of urbanization) and the gradual expansion of its electorate. A crucial part of our test relies on studying the responses of MPs to the electoral reforms of 1884-85. Using an original constituency-level dataset with information on electoral outcomes and constituency characteristics, we consider how changes in the social class, sectoral and religious composition of a legislator’s electorate altered MPs’ voting behavior before and after the reform. To isolate the effect of changing electorate composition on legislator behavior, we use a difference-in-differences research design that exploits variation the fact that (1) franchise requirements only changed in county constituencies (but not in boroughs) and (2) only a fraction of constituencies were redistricted.

Title
How do Rulers Rule? Coordination, Coercion and Political Order
Luz Marina Arias

Under a state of anarchy, confrontation between bandits can lead to the formation of an organization with the capacity to enforce political order, i.e a state. This paper analyzes the conditions that lead to different types of political regimes. In particular, I focus on the role of legitimacy in explaining the resulting distribution of coercive power within the successful bandit or bandits, now autocratic rulers (ranging from one despotic ruler to various autonomous local political/military authorities, e.g. feudalism) and the institutions necessary to sustain their rule (e.g representative assemblies, political parties). I propose an operational definition of legitimacy: the ability to coordinate (non-coercively) the beliefs of each bandit or power-holder regarding the behavior of other power-holders. I analyze the strategic conditions under which a bandit with legitimacy can leverage this "power" derived from focalness (and equilibrium selection) into despotic political order. That is, bandits voluntarily give up their military power under some circumstances. In traditional explanations, state structures develop bases for legitimacy after having emerged from coercive confrontation: the strongest bandit defeats all the rest, for instance. The argument here clarifies the interaction between coordination, coercion and collective action, and suggests a complementary and perhaps alternative pattern for the emergence of a legitimate authority with a monopoly on the use of force.

I use both a case study and large-N data to evaluate the implications of the theory. The theoretical argument builds on and is contrasted with the case of the late 19th century Porfirian regime in Mexico. It was not until the 1880s---almost 50 years after the war of independence---that Mexico managed to strengthen the central government and end with political instability in which one military general was replaced after another. By the end of the century, regions began to transfer resources to the center and reduced military expenditures, while military and security expenditures increased at the federal level.
c) Political economy of development – room A06

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<th>Title</th>
<th>Pro-poor or Political Targeting: An Analysis of Social Assistance in Developing Countries</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Marina Dodlova</td>
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<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Anna Giolbas (University of Goettingen, GIGA Hamburg) and Jann Lay (University of Goettingen, GIGA Hamburg)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>Politicians may use social policy and pro-poor spending for self-interest and strategic manipulation. This paper focuses on the politics of the design of social assistance programs in developing countries. In particular, it is explored how rent seeking may affect the choice of targeting mechanisms used to determine the beneficiary base of social transfer programs. Using the new NSTP dataset we are able to contrast more than 180 programs with categorical targeting, geographical targeting, community-based targeting, means testing, proxy means testing and self-targeting. The key attribute is the potential for political manipulation which can be assumed to be high if an intermediary is involved in the process of transfer eligibility or if the government can channel funds to specific regions. We argue that in view of subjectivity of decisions and more chances for manipulation such targeting schemes are more often adopted in societies with higher rent seeking. We present a simpler retrospective voting model to show that in more corruptible regimes an intermediary is more likely to be involved in the targeting process. Applying an IV approach based on the neighbours’ average rent seeking levels we find that indeed community-based and means tested programs that involve the assessment of beneficiaries’ eligibility by a social worker or community chief and geographical targeting are more often chosen in regimes with higher political corruption. On the contrary, proxy means tested programs that are based on ex ante evaluation of the poverty level and objective information on potential beneficiaries as well as self-targeting are significantly less prevalent in highly corrupt environments. This might be explained as they are less prone to be used for strategic manipulation. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of pro-poor versus political targeting.</td>
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<th>Title</th>
<th>Privileging one’s own? Voting patterns and politicized spending in India</th>
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<td>Presenter</td>
<td>Francesca R. Jensenius</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-author(s)</td>
<td>Pradeep Chhibber (UC Berkeley and Senior Visitor at IPERG, University of Barcelona)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>A large literature has demonstrated that politicians manipulate the allocation of public resources with an eye to winning the next election. These findings contrast with other work that shows that politicians often channel funds to their personal networks and supporters even when this is electorally inefficient. In this paper we argue that the choices of politicians are influenced by the type of networks politicians are embedded in. Politicians from parties that are embedded in a strong social network outside of the party (embedded parties) face pressures to allocate resources to members of that network. Politicians from parties without such clear ties to an external network are not similarly constrained and can focus on winning elections (electoralist parties). Using village-level data on the allocation of funds by politicians in India under a scheme called MPLADS (Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme), we show that MPs from embedded parties are more...</td>
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likely to allocate resources to villages where they won a large share of the vote, while politicians from electoralist parties gave more to competitive villages. Exploiting a natural experiment created by the implementation of new electoral boundaries in the 2009 election, we similarly show that politicians from embedded parties kept spending in areas that would not be in their constituency in the next election, while politicians from electoralist parties almost completely stopped spending in those areas. Taken together these findings contribute to our understanding of when and why we observe different forms of manipulation of public resources by politicians.

Title: Village Social Network Structures, Electoral Competition and Public Goods Provision
Presenter: Julien Labonne
Co-author(s): Cesi Cruz (University of British Columbia) and Pablo Querubin (New York University)
Abstract: A broad literature studies how social structure shapes political competition and the incentives of politicians to provide public goods. Examples include studies on the role of ethnic and religious fragmentation. However, in some societies, political cleavages and competition involve actors such as clans and extended families that are often hard to identify and study systematically.

Invited session and conclusion – room A25

Title: The Voting Rights Act & Minority Representation in U.S. Local Politics & Government
Presenter: Melissa Marshall

This conference is generously supported by the School of Economics and the School of Politics and International Relations, as well as by the following Research Priority Area at the University of Nottingham: Understanding Human Behaviour.